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The Standard for Effective Assistance
of Counsel in Pennsylvania-An
Ineffective Method of Ensuring
Competent Defense
Representation
I.

Introduction
While a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are

expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a
sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.'
Effective representation by criminal defense counsel is a theoretical prerequisite to the proper functioning of the adversary system.2 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a
criminal defendant is not assured a fair trial if defense counsel does
not render effective legal aid.3 The Court's recognition of the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, however, has not
included a precise definition of the term "effective assistance." 4
Consequently, the federal and state courts have developed diverse
standards of effective representation for appellate review of ineffectiveness claims.5
In the past decade, critics of the criminal justice system have
focused their attention on the variety of tests applied by federal and
6
state courts evaluating the adequacy of defense representation.
1. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1976).
2. One commentator explained the key justification for the need for effective defense
representation in the following manner:
For when an adversary proceeding, in our enlightened system of'justice, is used as the
sole means of putting relevant data before a court, every rational assumption underlying the system makes it essential that all parties be effectively represented by competent counsel. To allow the prosecutorial apparatus to operate against persons who
do not have equally adequate representation is to allow the system to operate at odds
with the very theory on which it rests. Without defense representation, society itself
would be deprived of valuable assistance and of information necessary to deal rationally and fairly with its members.
Meador, The Needfor EffectiveAssistance of Counsel 28 NLADA BRIEFCASE 75, 76-77 (1970).

3.
4.
5.
6.

See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See notes 17-24 and accompanying text infra
See notes 28-91 and accompanying text infra
A few of the harsher critics of the ineffectiveness tests include the following: Bazelon,

The DefectiveAssistance of Counsel, 42 U. CNN. L. REV.1 (1973); Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departuesfrom Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973);

Recognizing the weaknesses of a generalized standard of effective
assistance, numerous courts have changed their standards in recent
years.7 Accordingly, many federal and state courts have enunciated
specific principles for defense counsel to follow.8
Pennsylvania's current test of effective assistance of counsel exemplifies a generalized approach that allows a wide latitude of judicial discretion in the evaluation of counsel's performance.' Despite
the increasing recognition by other jurisdictions of the necessity for
specific guidelines of effective assistance,' ° Pennsylvania courts
steadfastly apply the vague test of a "reasonable basis."" I A substantial increase of claims of ineffective counsel in the past five years,
however, has motivated several
Pennsylvania justices to question the
2
value of the current test.'
After an initial review of the constitutional basis for effective
assistance of counsel, this comment provides an analysis and a survey of the current effective assistance standards employed by the circuit and state courts. An examination and critique of Pennsylvania's
standard are offered to illustrate the inefficiency of evaluating effective legal representation by a generalized standard.' 3 Finally, this
comment proposes a prescriptive effective assistance test with implementation techniques for administration by Pennsylvania courts.
II.

Background

A.

ConstitutionalHistory of Effective Assistance of Counsel

Although the right to counsel has firm constitutional underpinnings, 4 the right to effective assistance of counsel was initially articulated in the landmark Supreme Court case of Powell v.
Erickson, Standards of Competency/or Defense Counsel & a Criminal Case, 17 AM. CIuM. L.
REV. 233 (1979); Gard, IneffectiveAssistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L.
REv. 483 (1976); Comment, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel- A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as COMMENT]; Comment, A Standardfor the Effective Assistance of Counsel,
14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 175 (1978) [hereinafter cited as STANDARD].
7. See notes 39-91 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 78-91 and accompanying text Mra.
9. See generally notes 92-107 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 78-91 and accompanying text h.fra.
11. See notes 92-107 and accompanying text infra.
12. See Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting). But see Commonwealth v. Ford, 491 Pa. 586, 421 A.2d 1040 (1980) (majority
reaffirmed the test).
13. This comment specifically addresses the issue of effective assistance of counsel in the
criminal law area. Effective assistance of counsel in civil matters is more appropriately covered by articles pertaining to legal malpractice. For a discussion, of legal malpractice arising
from a criminal law proceeding, see notes 255-59 and accompanying text infra.
14. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Note, however, that the sixth amendment does not contain
the word "effective."

Alabama. 15 The Powell decision is the first in a long line of cases
recognizing that the sixth amendment requirement of counsel for

criminal defendants is essentially negated by counsel's failure to provide effective representation. 6 The Powell court, however, did not
affirmatively equate the right to counsel with the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the
duty to appoint counsel was not discharged "at such a time or under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case."' 7 Although the Court's references
to "effective" counsel were dicta, the Powell decision provided the
of a constitutional standard
initial impetus for further development
8
of effective representation. 1
Following the Powell decision, the Supreme Court substantially
enlarged the scope of the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to
counsel,' 9 but failed to provide additional insight into the signifi15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258
(1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); White v.
Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444 (1940).
17. 287 U.S. at 71. The Court also recognized that "the necessity of counsel was so vital
and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel
was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment." Id
(emphasis added).
Upon noting that a defendant is entitled to "effective aid," the Court lessened the significance of the term by equating it with the appointment of counsel: "In a case such as this,
whatever may be the rule in other cases, the right to have counsel appointed, when necessary,
is a logical corrollary from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel." Id at 72.
18. Further support for the premise that Powell served as the primary catalyst for future
ineffectiveness cases can be implied from Justice Sutherland's oft-quoted passage:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill andknowledge adequatelyto prepare
his defense, even though he have apefect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.
Id at 69 (emphasis added).
19. The right to counsel has proceeded through two constitutional avenues. In the federal courts, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) signified a shift by the Court from reliance
on the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment in right to counsel cases to a sixth amendment foundation. The Court expanded the Johnson ruling in Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942) to include the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in multiple representation cases. The state courts, relying on Powell, applied the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment in right to counsel cases. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
the Supreme Court retreated from its Johnson ruling by refusing to extend the sixth amendment right to counsel to state defendants. Thirty-one years after the Powell decision, the
Supreme Court finally incorporated the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
For a detailed discussion of the historical background of the right to counsel, see W.
BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL INAMERICAN COURTS (1955); Craig, The Right toAdequate
Representation in the Criminal Process.- Some Observations, 22 S.W. L.J. 260, 262-71 (1968).
A critical analysis of the import of the Gideon decision is included in Bazelon, The Reali-

cance of the concept of "effective assistance." Indeed, the Court frequently avoided direct confrontation with the effectiveness
question.2' Finally, in McMann v. Richardson,2' the Court recognized the need to articulate minimum levels of competency for criminal defense counsel.2 2 In deciding the admissibility of a defendant's
guilty plea based upon erroneous advice from counsel, the McMann
court broadened the definition of the right to counsel, as stated in the
sixth amendment, to include the right to effective assistance of counsel. 23 The Court stressed that counsel's performance must fall
"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
24
cases."

The McMann test of "within the range of competence" was not
intended to establish a uniform constitutional standard for ineffectiveness claims.2 5 Indeed, the Court's conclusion that each circuit
and state court should develop its own effective assistance test clearly

illustrates the Supreme Court's reluctance to define "effective" representation.26 Without sufficient guidance from the Supreme Court,
ties of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811 (1976), and in Bennett, Right to Counsel-A
Due Process Requirement, 23 LA. L. REV. 662 (1963).

20. The Court often employed repetitions of the Powell dicta. See, e.g., Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760
(1945); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
21. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
22. It is curious that the Supreme Court did not recognize the need for minimum levels
of competency for defense counsel until the McMann decision. One author remarked:
In view of the importance of the sixth amendment, the long delay attending its recognition as the source of the right to effective assistance of counsel is at first puzzling.
The only gloss on the original language of the sixth amendment would be the addition of the word "effective." Moreover, Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell indicates that at the time the case was decided, the Supreme Court was measuring the
right to effective assistance of counsel by the right to counsel.
Bines, supra note 6, at 936 n.47.
23. 397 U.S. at 761-64, 771.
24. Id at 771.
25. An analysis of the McMann opinion yields various interpretations of the import of
the "within the range of competence" language. The decision could be construed as creating a
uniform constitutional standard for ineffectiveness cases. Indeed, Justice Brennan, inhis dissent stated as much: "The Court abruptly forecloses the impact of an allegedly coerced confession by decreeing that the assistance of 'reasonablycompetent' counsel insulates a defendant
from the effects of a prior illegal
confession. .. .[T]he absolute rigor of its new rule must be
adjusted." Id at 777 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Conversely, the opinion could be confined to the circumstances of the case. It is obvious
that the McMann court regarded the ineffectiveness claim as a collateral issue since the claim
was neither argued nor briefed. The discussion of effective assistance could be regarded as
dictum and thus not binding on the lower courts. Finally, even if the language connotes an
effective assistance test, the decision could be limited to the guilty plea situation.
It is suggested that the latter interpretation is more plausible in light of the failure of many
lower courts to comply with the McMann holding. See Comment, Ineffective Representation as
a Bais/or Relie/from Convictio. Princplesfor Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc.

PROB. 1, 45 n.162 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PlUNCIPLEs]
26. The Court stated:
Beyond [the requirement of competent counsel] we think the matter, for the most
part, should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that

the federal and state courts have developed tests that apply diverse
principles to evaluate an attorney's performance." Not surprisingly,
the result is confusion and discord among the circuit and state courts
over the proper definition of "effective" assistance.
B. Divergent Standards in Federaland State Courts
The formulation and continuous reformulation of effective
assistance tests in the lower federal courts and in state courts illustrates the confusion surrounding the correct definition of effective
representation.2 8 The Due Process Clause of the fifth2 9 or fourteenth 30 amendment and the sixth amendment 3 ' mandate of the
right to counsel provide the courts with the basic tools to construct a
standard of effective assistance. Despite the common constitutional
denominator, the courts have developed a diverse collection of tests
that generally fall within four broad categories: the "farce and
mockery" test, the "reasonably effective assistance" approach, the
"reasonably competent attorney" test and the checklist approach.
1. The "Farce and Mockery" Test.-Predicated on the Due
Process Clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendment, the "farce and
mockery" test is the original standard applied by appellate courts
reviewing an attorney's representation.32 This test determines
whether counsel's performance was so inadequate that the trial was
judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who
are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.
397 U.S. at 77 1.
The Supreme Court's continued reluctance to enunciate specific standards is clearly indiSee United
cated by the Court's denial of certiorari to those cases arising after McMwn
States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) (Decoster 11f), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979);
Maryland v. Marzullo, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
27. See notes 32-91 and accompanying text inca. The state of confusion in the federal
and state courts prompted Justice White of the United States Supreme Court to launch a scathing attack on the Court's judicial responsibility:
[I]n the last analysis, it is this Court's responsibility to determine what level of competence satisfies the constitutional imperative. It also follows that we should attempt
to eliminate disparities in the minimum quality of representation required to be provided to indigent defendants. In refusing to review a case which so clearly frames an
issue that has divided the Courts of Appeals, the Court shirks its central responsibility as the court of last resort, particularly its function in the administration of criminal justice under a Constitution such as ours.
Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1012-13 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
28. See notes 32-91 and accompanying text hkfra)
29. In ineffectiveness cases, most federal courts apply the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: "No person shall... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
30. Many state courts apply the fourteenth amendment Due Process Clause to ineffectiveness cases. The relevant portion of the fourteenth amendment provides: "No state shall
U.S.
. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. See note 14 supra
32. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), first set
forth the "farce and mockery" test.

reduced to a "farce" or a "mockery of justice."33 Under this approach, the defendant is faced with the difficult burden of proving
extreme prejudice from counsel's ineffective advocacy.34 Indeed, a

few jurisdictions require a showing by the defendant that counsel's
representation virtually amounted to "no representation" at all.35
The initial justification for the severity of the "farce and mockery" test centered on a pronounced concern that the courts would be
deluged with baseless claims concocted by jailhouse attorneys. 36 Additionally, appellate courts frequently rejected ineffectiveness claims
because most judges disliked the thought of placing defense counsel
on trial for his actions in representing a criminal defendant. 37 Opponents of this stringent test argued that the standard was too narrow,
33. A current survey of the federal and state courts indicates that two circuits and seventeen states continue to apply some form of the "farce and mockery" test. See United States v.
Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), (Decoster III), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); United
States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); Goodman v. State,
387 So. 2d 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Dippre, 121 Ariz. 596, 592 P.2d 1252 (1979);
Neal v. State, 270 Ark. 442, 605 S.W.2d 421 (1980); People v. Borges, 88 Ill. App. 3d 912, 410
N.E.2d 1076 (1980); Keys v. State, - Ind. -, 390 N.E.2d 148 (1979); Nickell v. Commonwealth,
565 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1978); State v. Dutremble, 392 A.2d 42 (Me. 1978); People v. Strodder,
394 Mich. 193, 229 N.W.2d 318 (1975); Boyle v. Warden, 95 Nev. 888, 603 P.2d 1068 (1979);
State v. Pace, 171 N.J. Super. 240, 408 A.2d 808 (1979); State v. Luna, 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d
340 (1979); State v. Arsenault, 46 N.C. App. 7, 264 S.E.2d 592 (1980); State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio
St. 2d 107, 413 N.E.2d 819 (1980); McCray v. State, 271 S.C. 185, 246 S.E.2d 230 (1978);
Slayton v. Weinberger, 213 Va. 690, 194 S.E.2d 703 (1973); State v. Ermert, 94 Wash. 2d 839,
621 P.2d 121 (1980); Ash v. State, 555 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1976).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recent decision in United States v. Decoster,
624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (DecosterIII) replaced that Circuit's previous test of a "reasonably competent attorney." The new test defines ineffective assistance as representation that
blots out a substantial defense. Id. at 206. This new test signifies a shift by the judiciary back
to the tougher due process "farce and mockery" test. "This may fairly be regarded as a refinement of the 'gross incompetence' language ..
" Id.
For a detailed evolution of one court's ineffectiveness standard, compare United States v.
Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (DecosterT) with United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d
196, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Decoster11) and United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.)
(DecosterIII), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979). For a critical analysis of the Decoster trilogy,
see Comment, DecosterIII. New Issues in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 71 J. CEmI. L. 275
(1980); Note, 25 VILL. L. REv. 566 (1979-80).
34. The difficulty of meeting this burden is illustrated by the following examples: United
States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970) (counsel slept through the trial, but still effective);
Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957
(1968) (counsel's blatant ignorance of the law resulted in defendant's deportation, but still
effective); Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941) (counsel intoxicated, but still
effective).
35. United States ex rel Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1948); In re Murphy, 125 Vt. 272, 273, 214 A.2d 317, 318 (1965).
36. See Erickson, supra note 6, at 238. See also Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), in which Justice Arnold expressed the concern that a
liberal definition of ineffectiveness would open a "Pandora's box" of ineffectiveness claims.
Cf. May v. State, 263 Ind. 690, 338 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
A similar justification for the severity of the "farce and mockery" test is the potential for
collusion between the attorney and the defendant in deliberately mishandling a case. See
State v. Dreher, 137 Mo. 11, 23, 38 S.W. 567, 570 (1897). Accord, People v. Ortiz, 22 Ill. App.
3d 788, 795, 317 N.E.2d 763, 768 (1974).
37. As one court remarked:
No reputable member of the bar would, nor indeed should, undertake as a public
duty the defense of an accused, if the courts were to permit the client thereafter to

institute, by allegations as to trial tactics, a public inquiry into the professional com-

offered little practical guidance to the bar and the court, and was
overly protective of the legal profession.38 The gradual realization
that the "farce and mockery" test does little to protect the criminal
defendant against incompetent counsel has motivated numerous
courts to reject the approach in recent years.39
2 The 'Reasonably Effective Assistance" Approach.-The collective rejection of the "farce and mockery" test has compelled several federal and state courts to search for an appropriate
replacement. The decision by the Fifth Circuit in MacKenna v. Ellis' served as the precursor to the contemporary test of "reasonably
effective assistance."'" The Fifth Circuit announced that a criminal
defendant is entitled to representation "reasonably likely to render,
and rendering reasonably effective assistance."4 2 Various interpretations of the MacKenna formulation appeared in later decisions in
petence of the lawyer. This would surely be the end of the lawyers' duty to accept
assignments by the courts.
Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
Additionally, it is argued that a defendant is not entitled to "error-free representation."
Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1973).
38. The arguments in support of such a strict standard are groundless. First, the severity
of the "farce and mockery" test has done little to deter prisoners from filing ineffectiveness
claims. Indeed, one court stated that "our repeated declarations of what is required to set
aside a judgment. . . appears to have made no impression." May v. State, 263 Ind. 690, 692,
338 N.E.2d 258, 260 (1975). Second, it is doubtful that an attorney would deliberately mishandle a case:
Attorneys generally are greatly concerned with their professional reputations. They
know that to lose a good reputation for faithful adherence to the cause of their client
is not only to lose that which they should most highly treasure but is to lose their
practice as well.
Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 706 (5th Cir. 1965). Moreover, it is a mere exaggeration to
suggest that a liberal standard places an attorney on trial. See United States v. Decoster, 487
F.2d 1197, 1202 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Decoster I).
Professional responsibility and accountability demand that attorneys evaluate themselves
with a tougher test than a "mockery ofjustice." "It may be something of a puzzle to outsiders
why lawyers, who demand so much of other professionals, ask so little of themselves. Doctors,
after all, owe their patients much more than a mockery of medicine." Bines, supra note 6, at
928 (footnote omitted).
Additionally, the narrowness of the "farce and mockery" standard undercuts the fair and
consistent application of the test since flagrant errors, which occur in pre-trial or post-trial
proceedings, rarely appear in the trial record. Thus, claims are often dismissed without actually measuring effectiveness. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at 30-35. Another rationale supporting the "farce and mockery" test is that "you get what you pay for." Consequently, many
courts will not overturn a defendant's conviction because the incompetent attorney was the
defendant's voluntary, albeit unfortunate, choice. Id at 35-36. See Andrews v. Robertson,
145 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 874 (1945).
39. See, e.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1342 (1980);
Meeks v. State, 382 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1980); Johnson v. State, 620 P.2d 1311 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980); State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979).
40. 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), ordermodified 289 F.2d 928 (en banc), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 877 (1961).
41. See Comment, The Right to Competent Defense Counsel: Emergence of a Sixth
Amendment StandardofReview on Appeal and the Persistenceof the "Sham and Farce"Rule in
Calfornia, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 355, 367 (1975) [hereinafter cited as EMERGENCE].
42. 280 F.2d at 599 (court's emphasis).

other jurisdictions.43 These courts require defense counsel to render
"reasonably effective counsel,"' "genuine and effective legal representation, '45 or representation that entails a "reasonable basis."'
Theoretically, the "reasonably effective assistance" test indicates
47
a shift from due process standards to sixth amendment review.
The reviewing court scrutinizes all aspects of counsel's performance
to determine if the assistance rendered was reasonably effective.4 8
Under due process analysis, however, the review is not of counsel's
performance but of the overall trial proceedings. 49 Additionally, the

"reasonably effective assistance" test employs a hindsight evaluation

of defense counsel's actions or omissions.5 ° This approach deems
representation sufficiently effective if counsel prepares and conducts
the defense with reasonable knowledge and skill, exercising a rea-

sonably intelligent selection of trial tactics. 5

While the "reasonably effective assistance" test suggests a sixth
amendment review of ineffectiveness claim, the practical application
of the test by the courts indicates that this approach never left the
due process realm.52 Without a clear explanation of the specific du43. Currently, two circuits and eleven states apply some form of the "reasonably effective
assistance" test. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); MacKenna v. Ellis,
280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961); People v. Blalock, 197 Colo.
320, 592 P.2d 406 (1979); Hall v. State, 408 A.2d 287 (Del. 1979); Meeks v. State, 382 So. 2d
673 (Fla. 1980); Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458, 590 P.2d 1082 (1979); Berry v. State, 345 So.
2d 613 (Miss. 1977); People v. Bell, 48 N.Y.2d 933, 401 N.E.2d 180, 425 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1979);
Commonwealth ex rel Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967); State v.
DesRoches, 110 R.L. 497, 293 A.2d 913 (1972); State v. McBride, - S.D. -, 296 N.W.2d 551
(1980); Van Sickle v. State, 604 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Ahearn, 137 Vt.
253, 403 A.2d 696 (1979).
44. People v. Blalock, 197 Colo. 320, 325, 592 P.2d 406, 409 (1979); Meeks v. State, 382
So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1980).
45. Hall v. State, 408 A.2d 287, 288 (DeL 1979).
46. Commonwealth ex reL Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352
(1967).
47. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at 39. A due process analysis requires the defendant
to show that defense counsel's gross incompetence overwhelmingly prejudiced the outcome of
the trial, and resulted in a farce or a mockery of justice. Under sixth amendment analysis, a
defendant need not show that the outcome of the trial was a farce. Instead, the focus is on the
attorney's actions and whether those actions reasonably protected a defendant's interests.
Thus, the attorney's pre-trial and post-trial conduct is scrutinized. See Comment, Defects in
Inefective Assistance Standards Used by Slate Courts, 50 U. CoLo. L. REV. 389, 403-04 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as D'crsJ].
48. DEFECTS, supra note 47, at 403.
49. Id
50. Id at 404.
51. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
52. DEFECTS, supra note 47, at 402-03. Although the "reasonably effective assistance"
test is touted as a more objective approach to ineffectiveness claims, it is suggested that the test
is a mere gloss over the "farce and mockery" subjective approach. As one court observed:
It is argued that such a standard is "objective" whereas the "mockery" standard is
"subjective." The search for objectivity should not obscure common-sense analysis.
Indeed, if objectivity is thought to be that which excludes relativity, we can not see
that the federal standard is objective.
Bucci v. State, 263 Ind. 376, 378, 332 N.E.2d 94, 95 (1975).

ties of a "reasonably effective" attorney,5 3 the courts have resorted to
due process concepts to determine the parameters of reasonable defense conduct.5 4 Consequently, the courts examine the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the case-an analysis similar to the
"farce and mockery" approach." Furthermore, application of a
hindsight evaluation of counsel's performance limits the court's review to the "cold record" of the trial which often does not document
56
the complete acts or omissions of counsel.
3. The 'Reasonably Competent Attorney" Test. -In the wake
of the Supreme Court's decision in McMann v. Richardson,57 a growing number of jurisdictions have replaced the "farce and mockery"
test with some form of a "reasonably competent attorney" standard.58 These courts scrutinize the particular acts or omissions of
defense counsel to determine if that conduct falls within the range of
competence of the reasonably competent attorney. 59 To prevail on

an ineffectiveness claim under this approach, a defendant must show
not only that counsel failed to meet the standard of the reasonably
competent attorney but that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.'
53. For an example of specific duties, see note 79 in/rex
54. DEFECTS, supra note 47, at 402-03.
55. Id
56. Comment, New Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard-PrejudiceRequired, 10
GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 75, 80 (1980). Although a review of a "cold record" of the trial is a
disadvantage of this test, most courts have circumvented this problem by providing an evidentiary hearing to fully develop all facts from the trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460
Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975).
57. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
58. Approval of the "reasonably competent attorney" test is indicated by recent decisions. Currently, seven circuits and twenty-two states employ some form of this test. See Dyer
v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1342 (1980); United States v. Bosch,
584 F.2d 1113 (Ist Cir. 1978); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United
States ex rel Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876
(1976); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1976);
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc); Larson v. State, 614 P.2d 776
(Ark. 1980); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979); Buckley v.
Warden, 177 Conn. 538, 418 A.2d 913 (1979); Birt v. Hopper, 245 Ga. 221, 265 S.E.2d 276
(1980); State v. Antone, - Hawaii -, 615 P.2d 101 (1980); State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149,
609 P.2d 1140 (1980); Watson v. State, 294 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1980); State v. Myles, 389 So.2d
12 (La. 1980); Jones v. State, 38 Md. App. 288, 380 A.2d 659 (1977); Commonwealth v. Rondeau, - Mass. -, 392 N.E.2d 1001 (1979); White v. State, 309 Minn. 476, 248 N.W.2d 281
(1976); Scales v. State, 580 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); State v. Rose, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d
1074 (1981); State v. Journey, 207 Neb. 717, 301 N.W.2d 82 (1981); State v. West, 117 N.H.
340, 373 A.2d 348 (1977); State v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1978); Johnson v. State, 620
P.2d 1311 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); Krummacher v. Gierloff, 47 Ore. App. 119, 614 P.2d 109
(1980); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975); State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979);
Scott v. Mohn, - W. Va. -, 268 S.E.2d 117 (1980); Roe v. State, 95 Wis.2d 226,290 N.W.2d 291
(1980).
59. This test is derived from the Supreme Court's language in McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. at 771 (1970). See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra
60. See McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974). There are three methods of
allocating the burden of proof. At one extreme, a defendant need only prove counsel's ineffectiveness for a reversal of his conviction. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696-97
(6th Cir. 1974). At the other extreme, several courts require the defendant to provide proof of

The Third Circuit's variation of a "reasonably competent attorney" test, articulated in Moore v. United States,6 1 has received widespread approbation.6 2 The Moore court ruled that effective
assistance of counsel is rendered when counsel has exercised the
"customary skill and knowledge" prevailing among attorneys in the
community.63 Under the Moore test, the reviewing court measures
the quality of counsel's representation against the normal level of
performance expected of the legal practitioner.' The Third Circuit
test, also known as the "community standards" approach, is analogous to the standard applied in civil malpractice suits, which evaluates the performance of professional groups under the tort theory of
negligence.65
The "reasonably competent attorney" test or the "community
standards" approach better effectuates the sixth amendment right to
effective representation than either the "farce and mockery" test or
the "reasonably effective assistance" standard. First, the "reasonably competent attorney" approach encourages greater precision in
the evaluation of ineffectiveness claims by combining the benefit of

an expanded judicial focus on all aspects of counsel's representation
with the additional benefit of using an objective gauge to measure
counsel's performance. 6 6 Consequently, the courts are able to avoid
the interpretive problems inherent in the creation of new standards.67
Second, measuring defense counsel's performance against the
level of skill and knowledge of other attorneys in the community
encourages the reviewing court to seek objective criteria on which to
base its decision. 68 Thus the inherent subjectivity of the other standards is reduced. 69 A final advantage of this approach is its reliance
prejudice from counsel's errors. See United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112,
1115 (3d Cir. 1970). The middle-of-the-road approach shifts the burden to the state to prove
that the attorney's errors were harmless. See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
61. 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
62. See Bines, supra note 6, at 31.
63. 432 F.2d at 736.
64. Id
65. The Third Circuit intentionally constructed an ineffectiveness test similar to the standard for malpractice in civil suits. Indeed, the only citations for the new test in the court's
opinion were civil negligence references. Id. at 737 n.27. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 299A (1965) provides:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise
the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in
good standing in similar communities.
66. EMERGENCE, supra note 41, at 370. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 32 (4th ed. 1971).
67. EMERGENCE, upra note 41, at 370; Bines, supra note 6, at 937.
68. See, e.g., Marzuilo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977).
69. One commentator has described the Moore test as the most "liberal and most objec-

on tort malpractice theory.7" A judgment that defense counsel did
not render effective assistance determined by a tort malpractice standard may provide a strong inference of negligence in a subsequent
malpractice suit against that attorney.7
Despite the appealing qualities of the "reasonably competent attorney" test, several weaknesses exist. The test is premised on each
court's subjective perception of the prevailing standards in the surrounding legal community.7 2 Further, this approach may tolerate
inadequate representation in those communities in which the prevailing legal practices do not satisfy constitutional requirements."
For instance, in Tollett v. Henderson,74 the Supreme Court found
that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise the defendant that the grand jury was racially segregated. 75 The Court,
utilizing the Moore test, reasoned that the attorneys practicing in
that community would not have challenged the composition of a racially segregated grand jury. 76 Thus, Tollett illustrates the possibility
tive standard to date." Flynn, Adequacy of Counsel The Emerging Fair Trial Issue for the.
Seventies 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19, 50 (1975). Another author explained the chief asset of this test:
Its chief advantage, however, lies in its ability to promote the policies which underlie
the basic right to counsel. No matter who actually represents an accused, a government prosecutor will always be faced with a hypothetical opponent positioned to
prevent or take advantage of unlawful government action. While this threat may not
prevent prosecutors from exploiting the tactical weakness of defense lawyers, it will
at least encourage them to insure the propriety of the elements of their own cases.
Bines, supra note 6, at 937 (footnotes omitted).
Notably, words like "objective" and "subjective" are often employed by courts in formulating an effective assistance test, but rarely denote the actual application of the test. Objective
tests utilize specific criteria, see note 78 and accompanying text infra Subjective tests are
premised on judicial notions of the proper principles of attorney competency. Despite the
semantical misinterpretations, courts that apply the "reasonably competent attorney" test argue that the test is objective because comparative legal standards are examined. If these standards are specifically stated, then the test is truly objective. Otherwise, the test retains its
subjective foundation.
70. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
71. Inferring negligence from an ineffectiveness claim to a legal malpractice suit may
create difficulties. Arguably, the attorney accused of ineffectiveness has not had his "day in
court." This assumption, however, is unsupported in most cases. Usually, an attorney must be
present at an evidentiary hearing to justify his actions or inactions. Thus, the attorney is given
fair notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard. To eliminate further procedural
hurdles, one respected author suggested joining the defense attorney as a party to the postconviction proceeding. It is argued that joinder of defense counsel "comports with modern
views of third party practice." Bines, supra note 6, at 978. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
For a further discussion of legal malpractice, see notes 255-59 and accompanying text
infra.
72. Erickson, supra note 6, at 241. Justice Bazelon's criticism of the Moore test concerned the vagueness of the words in the test: "[T]he new test is built on words like 'customary' or 'reasonable,' which are themselves empty vessels into which content must be poured."
Bazelon, supra note 19, at 820.
Another weakness of the Moore test is its failure to compare counsel's conduct to the
competent criminal attorney. It is argued that criminal law is a "specialty of extraordinary
technicality." Bines, supra note 6, at 939. Thus, lack of experience or expertise should not be
shouldered by the defendant represented by an appointed "patents" attorney. Id
73. Erickson, supra note 6, at 241.
74. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
75. Id at 266.
76. Id at 269.

of an entire legal community engaging in constitutionally questionable conduct. To alleviate this problem, the reviewing court should
remain sensitive to the possibilities of a Tollett-type situation and
should compel the attorneys in that community to meet minimum
constitutional requirements."
4. The Checklist Approach.-A

handful of courts have supple-

mented their tests with explicit minimum requirements of effective
representation. 78 These requirements are often in the form of a
checklist against which counsel can evaluate his or her performance.79 Theoretically, the reviewing court then compares counsel's
representation with these guidelines to determine the attorney's effectiveness.8 0 The function of the checklist approach is to reduce
"the occasions for judicial ad hoc resolution of difficult problems" as
well as to inform attorneys of the minimum requirements of effective
legal representation.8" The source of these minimum requirements 8is2
either tile reviewing court's interpretation of minimum standards
or the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards Relating to the
Defense Function."
Opponents of the checklist approach argue that the imposition
of categorical rules for defense counsel to follow will improperly interfere with the adversary process." Indeed, it is feared that, to in77. See Erickson, supra note 6, at 241-42.
78. See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 849 (1968); People
v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979); Scott v. Mohn, - W. Va. -, 268
S.E.2d 117 (1980); Roe v. State, 95 Wis.2d 226, 290 N.W.2d 291 (1980).
Other courts employing the "reasonably effective assistance" test have specifically incorporated certain minimum requirements into their case law. See People v. Gomberg, 38
N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 480 Pa. 7,
389 A.2d 58 (1978). Intermittent incorporation of specific guidelines, however, does not yield
the consistent results of complete incorporation. Since the selectively incorporating court,
more often than not, applies the incorporated guideline infrequently, limited utility and predictability results.
79. For example, the court, in Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 849 (1968), constructed a list of duties for defense counsel that the court had applied
intermittently in earlier effectiveness cases:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must
confer with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of
his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are
available. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal,
to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough
time for reflection and preparation for trial.
Id at 226 (footnote omitted).
For a literal checklist, see Bazelon, supra note 19, at 836-38.
80. Erickson, supra note 6, at 242.
81.
ING

INTRODUCTION TO ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELAT-

TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (App. Draft 1971).
82. See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).

83. See People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979).
84. As Justice Leventhal noted in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C.
Cir.) (Decoster III), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979): 'The court's appraisal requires a judgmental rather than a categorical approach. It must be wary lest its inquiry and standards

sure an errorless trial, the prosecutor and the trial judge would
continuously supervise the defense attorney to correct violations of
the minimum requirements.' 5 The fundamental flaw in this objection, however, is that the adversary system and its structural integrity
should not be of greater importance than the protection of a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights.8 6 Ideally, the adversary system
should strive to promote procedural regularity over structural balance. 7 Further, by insuring a criminal defendant the right to effective representation 'through the imposition of categorical rules, the
criminal justice system is assured of a fair trial through effective adversaries.'s
Additionally, the checklist approach is criticized for its inflexibility. The establishment of minimum guidelines for counsel's performance cannot encompass every possible act or omission of
defense counsel's representation. 9 Without the necessary flexibility
in appellate review of defense counsel's performance during the trial,
counsel will be extremely reluctant to pursue certain trial strategies
for fear of an ineffectiveness claim. 9 Nevertheless, certain aspects of
defense counsel's representation readily lend themselves to categori9
zation. i

III. The Pennsylvania Approach
A.

The Standard

Until 1967, Pennsylvania courts consistently applied the "farce
and mockery" test to determine effective assistance of counsel. 92 In
undercut the sensitive relationship between attorney and client and tear the fabric of the adversary system."
85. Id
86. See note 2 supra In response to Justice Leventhal's concern for the adversary system,
Justice Bazelon retorted: "But for so many indigent defendants the adversary system is already in shreds." United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 297 (D.C. Cir.) (Decoster III), cert.
denid, 444 U.S. 944 (1979) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Justice Bazelon's dissent in Decoster III
emphasizes the plight of the indigent defendant on which "the burden of less effective advocacy falls almost exclusively.. ." 624 F.2d at 266.
But Justice Leventhal contends that liberal ineffectiveness standards facilitate all types of
claims:
The ease with which a post trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be
made is evidenced by the reported claim of Patty Hearst, not normally thought of as
poor, that her defense counsel, the famed F. Lee Bailey, had provided her with ineffective assistance.
Id at 244 (Leventhal, J.).
87. See generally note 2 npra.
88. See COMMENT, supra note 6, at 767.
89. 'There is a danger that these concretized standards will be seen as a ceiling as well as
a floor." Bazelon, supra note 6, at 33.
90. See COMMENT, supra note 6, at 766.
91. Categorical rules for defense counsel's performance in the pre-trial and post-trial
context do not interfere with tactical decisions and foster conscientiousness. As one author
observed: "[Such rules] will merely force attorneys to expend more energy than they would
prefer to expend." Id
92. See, e-g., Commonwealth ex reL Mullenaux v. Myers, 421 Pa. 61, 67, 217 A.2d 730,

Commonwealth ex rel Smilley Y. Claudy,93 the Pennsylvania Superior Court examined an allegation that trial counsel inadequately
94

represented the defendant by improperly conducting the defense.

Relying on a decision from the Second Circuit,9" the Smilley court's
evaluation of the defendant's claim centered on a review of the character of the resultant proceedings to decide whether the trial resulted
in a "farce and a mockery of justice."9 6
Commonwealth ex rel Washington v. Maroney97 signalled a shift
in Pennsylvania from the "farce and mockery" test to a standard
similar to the "reasonably effective assistance" standard. 98 The Maroney court addressed whether shortness of time in consultation with
the defendant constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 99 The
court recognized the need for at least a minimal examination of
counsel's performance to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.l°° After reviewing the various ineffectiveness standards
in other jurisdictions, the court announced a new test for appellate
review of ineffectiveness claims:
733 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel LaRue v. Rundle, 417 Pa. 383, 386, 207 A.2d 829, 831
(1965); Commonwealth exret Crosby v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 81, 87, 202 A.2d 299, 303 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 976 (1965); Commonwealth ex re. Garrison v. Burke, 378 Pa. 344, 350, 106
A.2d 587, 590 (1954); Commonwealth ex rel Wherry v. Maroney, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 441, 44748, 193 A.2d 839, 842 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel Schenck v. Banmiller, 190 Pa. Super. Ct.
467, 469, 154 A.2d 320, 321 (1959); Commonwealth ex rel Dion v. Tees, 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 82,
89, 118 A.2d 756, 759 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel Richter v. Burke, 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 255,
259, 103 A.2d 293, 295 (1954); Commonwealth ex rel Smilley v. Claudy, 172 Pa. Super. Ct.
247, 250, 93 A.2d 894, 896 (1953).
93. 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 247, 93 A.2d 894 (1953).
94. Id at 250, 93 A.2d at 896.
95. The Smilley court referred to the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Wight,
176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950), which dealt with the shortness of
time before trial when counsel was appointed for the defendant.
96. 172 Pa. Super. Ct. at 250, 93 A.2d at 896. Later decisions discussed the purpose of
providing a stringent test:
The right to counsel and the effective assistance of counsel does not vest the petitioner with the absolute privilege of retroactively assessing the quality of his counsel's
trial representation against his present feeling as to what might have been better strategy. Only one test could evolve if such were the standard: Was the accused acquitted? And, of course, if that were the test it would never be used because there would
be no need for appeal.
Commonwealth ex rel LaRue v. Rundle, 417 Pa. 383, 388, 207 A.2d 829, 832 (1965).
97. 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
98. Id See also Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 249 n.5, 393 A.2d 642, 647 n.5
(1978). Compare notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra with notes 40-56 and accompanying text supra. The Maroney "reasonable basis" test is more similar to the "reasonably effective assistance" test than the "reasonably competent attorney" approach because the courts
examine the particular actions of that attorney vis-a-vis the trial instead of making a comparison to other reasonable attorneys. But see Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 406 A.2d 735 (1979)
(O'Brien, J., dissenting).
99. 427 Pa. at 607-08, 235 A.2d at 354-55. The Maroney court, confronted with an issue
of first impression, rejected the defendant's contention that shortness of time constitutes ineffectiveness per se. Id
100. Id at 603, 235 A.2d at 352. Significantly, the court voiced its reluctance to evaluate a
fellow attorney's performance: "We approach such a task always mindful of the presumption
that counsel is competent and with the realization that no one, be they members of Bench or
Bar, relishes an opportunity to evaluate the product of another attorney." Id The court
sought to reassure the collective Bar by emphasizing that the attorney would not be on trial.

[O]ur inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular
course chosen by counsel had some reasonablebasis designed to
effectuate his client's interests. The test is not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation
of the record. Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is
determined
that trial counsel's decision had any reasonable bal
sis. 01

The Maroney court emphasized that its analysis of counsel's performance would be limited to an "independent review of the record
. . .and an examination of counsel's stewardship of the now challenged proceedings in light of the available alternatives."' 0
Notwithstanding attacks from justices 0 3 and commentators'0 4
alike, the Maroney test of a "reasonable basis" has survived fourteen
years of frequent application without substantive alterations.'0 5 A
judicial rule, however, is rarely complete without some type of procedural mechanism to insure its proper implementation." 6 Consequently, changes in procedural requirements have influenced the
ultimate substantive application of the "reasonable basis" test. 0 7
B.

ProceduralRequirements

I. Prejudice.-In Pennsylvania, a defendant must prove that
defense counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced the defendant's case. 0 8
Theoretically, the Maroney court's decision marks a shift from due process analysis to sixth
amendment review.
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Constitution contains a provision for the right to counsel:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and by counsel.

...PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.

101. 427 Pa. at 604-05, 235 A.2d at 352-53 (footnote omitted) (court's emphasis).
102. Id at 604, 235 A.2d at 352 (citation omitted).
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 246, 420 A.2d 431, 434 (1980)
(Larsen, J., concurring).
104. One commentator has remarked: "Although the Pennsylvania courts have insisted
that this evaluation (in the "reasonable basis" test) should not be made with the use of hindsight, it is difficult to see how that can be avoided." PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at 46.
105. Although the Maroney test was decided in. the context of a collateral review habeas
corpus proceeding, it has remained the governing standard for all ineffectiveness claims.
Recently, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to change its effective
assistance test. The court declined, noting that despite the "longevity of the Washington v.
Maroney standard," the test remains "the law in Pennsylvania." Commonwealth v. Ford, 491
Pa. 586, 590, 421 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1980).
106. For example, the judicially created exclusionary rule requires a suppression hearing
as the procedural mechanism to eliminate illegally obtained evidence.
107. For a discussion of the procedural changes in ineffectiveness claims, see notes 108140 and accompanying text infra
108. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frankhouser, 491 Pa. 171, 180, 420 A.2d 396, 401 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 249, 393 A.2d 642, 647 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 478 Pa. 406, 416, 387 A.2d 46, 52 (1978); Commonwealth v.
Rice, 477 Pa. 221, 228, 383 A.2d 903, 907 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 278,
372 A.2d 687, 696 (1977); Commonwealth v. Woody, 440 Pa. 569, 574, 271 A.2d 477, 480
(1970).
In dual representation - ineffectiveness cases, however, prejudice need not be shown. See,

Prior to the Maroney decision, a defendant had the difficult burden
of proving that counsel's inadequate representation overwhelmingly
prejudiced the trial proceedings. "0 Under "reasonable basis" analysis, however, the Maroney court initially appeared to eliminate this
requirement of prejudice. 0 The court stated that "if there is no reasonable basis to support trial counsel's decisions,... his decisions a
fortiori were prejudicial to the client.""' Thus, any defendant who
proved that his counsel's acts or omissions did
not have a reasonable
2
basis was automatically entitled to relief."
Although the Maroney language suggested that a presumption
of prejudice arose merely from counsel's ineffectiveness, later decisions clarified the allocation of the burden of proof.'
In Commonwealth v. Hubbard,"' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted
the Maroney decision to include an initial showing of prejudice to
the defendant." 5 This threshold requirement of prejudice entailed
proof by the defendant that the issue not asserted by defense counsel
was an issue of arguable merit.16 Accordingly, defense counsel
7
would not be ineffective for failing to raise a baseless claim."
Thus, the present test for effective assistance of counsel requires
a two-step analysis. First, a defendant must show that the allegation
of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit." 8 If the court decides that
e.g., Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 484 Pa. 534, 400 A.2d 160 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Duffy, 483 Pa. 170, 394 A.2d 965 (1978). See generally notes 173-76 and accompanying text
109. See Commonwealth ex re. Crosby v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 81, 87, 202 A.2d 299, 303
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 976 (1965).
110. 427 Pa. at 605 n.8, 235 A.2d at 353 n.8. The court explained its justification for not
requiring a defendant to prove prejudice from counsel's ineffectiveness:
Since our test requires that we examine the approach employed by trial counsel in
light of the available alternatives, a finding of ineffectiveness could never be made
unless we concluded that the alternatives not chosen offered a potential for success
substantially greater than the tactics actually utilized.
Id
Ill. Id
112. Id
113. Many defendants requested the court to find ineffectiveness per se; the court declined.
Indeed, Justice Larsen's recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Pettus, - Pa. -, -, 424 A.2d 1332,
1335 (1981) typifies the court's dislike for per se determinations: "Perserules are so harsh and
depersonalizing that only in extreme cases need they even be considered." The increase in
requests for per se ineffectiveness rulings motivated the court to require the defendant to prove
prejudice, a requirement not previously articulated except in dicta. See, eg., Commonwealth
v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 249, 393 A.2d 642, 647 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 478 Pa. 406, 416, 387 A.2d 46, 52 (1978); Commonwealth v. Rice, 477 Pa.
221, 228, 383 A.2d 903, 907 (1978). Contra, Commonwealth v. Morin, 477 Pa. 80, 383 A.2d
832 (1978).
114. 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977).
115. Id at 278, 372 A.2d at 696. The Pennsylvania Superior Court appears to abolish any
requirement of prejudice in Commonwealth v. William-, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 416 A.2d 1132
(1979). In Wdliamu, the court stated that "a finding of ineffectiveness of counsel does not
require a showing of prejudice." Id at -, 416 A.2d at 1134.
116. 472 Pa. at 259, 372 A.2d at 696.
117. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 489 Pa. 129, 133, 413 A.2d 1047, 1049 (1980).
118. See Commonwealth v. Brightwell, - Pa. -, 424 A.2d 1263 (1981); Commonwealth v.
Burton, 491 Pa. 13, 417 A.2d 611 (1980).

counsel's failure to raise a certain issue was arguably ineffective
assistance, then the court proceeds to the second level of analysis.
The defendant must then show that defense counsel did not have a
reasonable basis designed to effectuate the defendant's interests."19
2. Reviewability. -Currently, a defendant may raise a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal 20 or through a
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) 12 1 proceeding. A direct appeal is the procedure for attacking the adequacy of trial counsel's
representation. 22 Conversely, a PCHA proceeding is the proper
course for alleging ineffective appellate counsel, 23 although certain
situations exist in which a defendant may raise ineffectiveness of trial
counsel at a PCHA proceeding. 24 Because of the complexity of the
procedures involved in raising a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a brief overview of the procedural evolution of these claims
facilitates a clearer understanding of the process.
Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Clair,125 the number of ineffectiveness claims has increased
in dramatic proportions. 26 The Clair court ruled that issues not preserved for review by a timely and specific allegation of error in post119. Furthermore, the defendant always has the burden of proving the substance of his or
her allegations of ineffective counsel. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 479 Pa. 60, 62, 387
A.2d 834, 834-35 (1978); Commonwealth v. Logan, 468 Pa. 424, 433, 364 A.2d 266, 271 (1976);
Commonwealth ex rel Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 609-10, 235 A.2d 349, 365 (1967).
120. Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975); Commonealth v. Carter,
463 Pa. 310, 344 A.2d 846 (1975). See Comment, Pennsylvania Waiver Doctrine in Criminal
Proceedings: Itr Application andRelationslp to the IneffectivenessAssistance of Counsel Claim,
15 DuQ. L. REv. 217, 237 (1976-77) [hereinafter cited as WAIVER DOCTRINE].
121. Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, 19 P.S. § 1180-1-1180-14 (Supp. 1978-79)
(repealed, Act of June 26, 1981, P.L. No. 4.1, (H.B. 41) (effective June 27, 1982). The purpose
of the Act was to establish the following:
[A] post conviction procedure for providing relief from convictions obtained and
sentences imposed without due process of law. The procedure hereby established
shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose that
exist when this statute takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis. However, nothing in this act limits the availability of remedies in the trial court or on
direct appeal.
Id at 19 P.S. § 1180-2, 3. See also Commonwealth v. James, 484 Pa. 180, 398 A.2d 1003
(1979).
For a complete discussion of the Act, see Doty & Bluestine, The Purposesand Application
of the Pennsylvania Post Conviction HearingAct, 45 PA. B.A.Q. 480 (1974).
122. See Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975).
123. Id
124. See generally notes 140 & 206 and accompanying text in/ra; WAIVER DOCTRINE,
supra note 120.
125. 458 Pa. 418, 326.A.2d 272 (1974).
126. The proliferation of ineffectiveness claims in the past seven years was caused in part
by the language in Clair and in part by easy accessibility to the appellate courts through allegations of ineffective counsel WAIVER DOCTRINE, supra note 120. The procedure for raising
a claim of ineffective counsel is by checking the box marked "The denial of my constitutional
right to representation by a competent lawyer" on the PCHA petition. This box is one of
fourteen boxes describing various procedural or constitutional violations. See 19 PA. R. CIuM.
P. Rule 1501. Realistically, a prisoner glancing at a list of fourteen boxes will check off as
many as possible to attack a conviction. Consequently, ineffectiveness claims are raised as a

trial motions are waived on appeal.1 27 Although the Clair waiver
doctrine signified a stricter judicial scrutiny of unpreserved claims
than the previous rule, 128 Justice Nix's remark that "any error that
deprives a defendant of due process can more properly be remedied
by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . ." substantially
lessened the severity of the doctrine.' 29 Consequently, criminal de-

fendants, unhappy with their convictions, followed Justice Nix's advice and filed ineffectiveness claims in the PCHA forum.' 3 0
The ensuing proliferation of ineffectiveness claims prompted the

supreme court to change the procedure for filing ineffectiveness appeals. In Commonwealth v. Dancer,I"'the court required that all ineffectiveness claims, with four exceptions, be raised on direct
appeal. 132 The primary purpose of Dancer was to transfer the maroutine matter. For statistics on the frequency of ineffective counsel claims in PCHA petitions,
see note 140 infr.
Significantly, the PCHA provides for allegations of "incompetent counsel." Yet the "reasonable basis" test concerns the "effectiveness" of counsel. Although there is a notable difference between "incompetence" and "ineffectiveness," Pennsylvania courts use the terms
interchangeably. Utilizing the term "incompetence" should facilitate disciplinary actions for
incompetency.
127. 458 Pa. at 422, 326 A.2d at 274. For example, when new counsel enters a case, he
must raise ineffectiveness of prior counsel at the first opportunity or he is deemed to have
waived the claim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fultz, 478 Pa. 207, 386 A.2d 513 (1978); Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 465 Pa. 392, 350 A.2d 822 (1976).
For ineffectiveness claims under the PCHA, a petitioner must show that the error resulting in his conviction and sentence has not been "finally litigated or waived." 19 P.S. § 11803(d) (Purdon 1978-79 Supp). Under the PCHA, an issue is "finally litigated" if it has been
raised in the trial court, the court has ruled on the merits of the issue and the petitioner has
"knowingly and understandingly" failed to avail himself of further appeals. Additionally, an
issue is finally litigated if the Pennsylvania Superior or Supreme Courts have ruled on the
merits of the issue. 19 P.S. § 1180-4(a)(1)(2)(3).
Further, an issue is waived, under the PCHA if the petitioner "knowingly and understandingly" failed to raise the issue and it could have been raised before trial, at trial or on
direct appeal or by a prior PCHA petition, and the petitioner is unable to.prove the existence
of "extraordinary circumstances" to justify the failure to raise this issue. 19 P.S. § 1180-4(b)(1)
and (2).
128. Prior to 1974, appellate review of unpreserved claims arose only if fundamental error
was evident from the trial record. For a discussion of the fundamental error doctrine, see
Comment, Appeal of Errors in the Absence of Objection-Pennsylvania's "FundamentalError"
Doctrine, 73 DICK. L. REV. 496 (1968-69).
Because trial counsel rarely raised a claim of his own ineffectiveness in post-trial motions,
a defendant had a minimal likelihood of success on his unpreserved ineffectiveness claim.
Indeed, the courts required clear and irrefutable proof of counsel's ineffectiveness before an
appellate court would review such a claim. Consequently, most defendants resorted to the
PCHA route to raise ineffectiveness claims. See Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 219 Pa. Super.
Ct. 344, 344 A.2d 625 (1971); WAIVER DOCTRINE, supra note 120, at 239.
In Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of "fundamental error" in civil cases. The
Clair court, therefore, was merely extending the Dilliplaine rationale to the criminal law
sphere. Id at 259, 322 A.2d at 116-17.
129. 458 Pa. at 422, 326 A.2d at 274.
130. WAIVER DOCTRINE, supra note 120, at 141.
131. 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975).
132. The four exceptions are as follows:
(1) where petitioner is represented on appeal by his trial counsel, for it is unrealistic
to expect trial counsel on direct appeal to argue his own ineffectiveness, (2) where the
petitioner is represented on appeal by new counsel, but the grounds upon which the

jority of ineffectiveness claims from the PCHA forum to the appellate courts.' 3 3

Although Dancer's goal was to eliminate the circuitous route
that a defendant took to obtain judicial review of an ineffectiveness
claim,' 34 subsequent interpretations of the four exceptions to the
Dancer rule merely exacerbated the procedural obstacles. For example, one exception is the situation in which the defendant's trial
counsel also represents the defendant on appeal. 35 The Dancer
court recognized that it would be "unrealistic to expect trial counsel
on direct appeal to argue his own ineffectiveness" and suggested that
a defendant could raise the issue of prior counsel's ineffectiveness at
the first stage of the appellate proceedings when the defendant is represented by new counsel.' 36 The court's failure to define the term
"new counsel," however, resulted in a barrage of cases suggesting the
correct definition. 137 The procedural morass generated by this one
exception to the Dancer rule is magnified3 by similar interpretive
problems with the other three exceptions.' 1
In essence, circumvention of the Clair waiver doctrine by claims
of ineffectiveness of counsel compelled the supreme court to limit the
procedural avenues available to a defendant.' 39 The supreme court's
failure to clarify these limits, however, produced the opposite result.
Instead of a reduction in ineffectiveness claims, the courts are inundated with such appeals."'4
claim of ineffective assistance are based do not appear in the trial record, (3) where
the petitioner is able to prove the existence of other "extraordinary circumstances"
justifying his failure to raise the issue . . . or (4) where the petitioner rebuts the
presumption of "knowing and understanding failure....
Id at 100-01, 331 A.2d at 438 (citations omitted).
133. Id The PCHA forum is usually the county court of common pleas. For a detailed
examination of the PCHA see Doty & Bluestine, supra note 121.
134. See generally WAIVER DocTRINE, supra note 120.
135. 460 Pa. at 100, 331 A.2d at 438. See note 132 supra (first exception).
136. 460 Pa. at 100, 331 A.2d at 438.
137. For example, has the defendant received "new counsel" if appellate counsel is a
member of the same public defender association as trial counsel? Commonwealth v. Willis, Pa. -, 424 A.2d 876 (1981) indicates that the defendant in this situation has not received "new
counseL" See also Commonwealth v. Fox, 476 Pa. 475, 383 A.2d 199 (1978); Commonwealth
v. Gardiner, 480 Pa. 7, 389 A.2d 58 (1978); Commonwealth v. Glasco, 481 Pa. 490, 393 A.2d 11
(1978); Commonwealth v. Patrick, 477 Pa. 284, 383 A.2d 935 (1978); Commonwealth v. Sherard, 477 Pa. 429, 384 A.2d 234 (1977); Commonwealth v. Wright, 473 Pa. 395, 374 A.2d 1272
(1977); Commonwealth v. Via, 455 Pa. 373, 316 A.2d 895 (1974); Commonwealth v. Vigue, Pa. Super. Ct. -, 420 A.2d 736 (1980).
138. Eg., Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975) (necessity for an
evidentiary hearing-second exception); Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 359 A.2d 369
(1976) ("extraordinary circumstances"-third exception); Commonwealth v. Strachan, 460 Pa.
407, 333 A.2d 790 (1975) ("knowing and understanding failure"-fourth exception).
139. Compare Commonwealth v. Learn, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 288, 335 A.2d 417 (1975)
(sanctioning circumvention of Clair) with Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 279 n.8,
372 A.2d 687, 696 n.8 (1977) (finding Learn in error on the circumvention issue).
140. A 1980-81 statistical sampling conducted by John Kennedy, statistician for the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts and the Conference of State Trial Judges on the
percentage of ineffectiveness claims raised in PCHA petitions indicates that eighty percent
(80%) of the petitions contain such allegations. This figure, however, is not indicative of the
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PracticalApplications

Criminal defendants in Pennsylvania have successfully attacked
counsel's representation involving almost every aspect of the criminal defense. The application of the "reasonable basis" test to certain
factual situations illustrates the areas of counsel's representation that
are more susceptible to judicial attack. Pre-trial conduct, trial conduct and post-trial conduct represent the divisions utilized in finding
defense counsel ineffective.
1. Pre-trialConduct.-Acts or omissions by criminal defense
counsel prior to the commencement of trial constitute one of the
most successful grounds for attack of a conviction for ineffectiveness
of counsel.' 4 ' Because counsel's inadequate representation at this
stage often prejudices the trial outcome, Pennsylvania courts take
special care to correct such deficiencies.' 42 Those areas of pre-trial
conduct commonly reviewed by the courts include investigation,
preparation, pre-trial motions, and guilty pleas.
Investigation of the case and preparation of an adequate defense represent expansive areas for appellate review. Absent proof
of prejudice to the defendant, Pennsylvania courts are reluctant to
find an attorney's pre-trial preparation and investigation inadequate. 143 Further, shortness of time in consultation with the defend44
ant does not create a presumption of inadequate preparation.
Nevertheless, the courts have expected defense counsel to predict future developments in the law, 45 to investigate and obtain important
defense witnesses," 4 and to pursue all necessary defenses. 47 For exnumber of ineffectiveness claims actually sustained by the appellate courts. Notably, only fifty
PCHA petitions were sampled (unpublished report).
141. See Gard, supra note 6, at 485.
142. See notes 143-165 and accompanying text nfra.
143. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349
(1967) in which the supreme court stated: "As with other assertions of a denial of constitutional rights in post-conviction proceedings, the burden remains throughout with the prisoner
to demonstrate any constitutional deprivation." Id at 608, 235 A.2d at 354.
144. "Mhe test in determining sufficiency of time in a lawyer's preparation for trial or
hearing is reasonableness." Commonwealth ex reL Johnson v. Russell, 428 Pa. 440, 445, 239
A.2d 399, 402 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Sisco, 482 Pa. 459, 393 A.2d 1197 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Owens, 454 Pa. 268, 312 A.2d 378 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hill, 450 Pa.
477, 301 A.2d 587 (1973); Commonwealth v. Woody, 440 Pa. 569, 271 A.2d 477 (1970).
145. Commonwealth v. Evans, 479 Pa. 100, 387 A.2d 854 (1979). Justice Pomeroy recently observed: "[W]e must expect the bar to keep fully abreast of developments in the law,
whether those developments be decisional, statutory, or rule of court." Commonwealth v.
Humphrey, 473 Pa. 533, 541-42, 375 A.2d 717, 721 (1977) (Pomeroy, J., concurring). Contra
Commonwealth v. Logan, 468 Pa. 424, 364 A.2d 266 (1976); Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442
Pa. 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971).
146. Commonwealth v. Potts, 486 Pa. 509, 406 A.2d 1007 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bailey, 480 Pa. 329, 390 A.2d 166 (1978); Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 359 A.2d 369
(1976). Biasee Commonwealth v. Barren, 273 Pa. Super. Ct. 492, 498-99,417 A.2d 1156, 1159
(1979) in which the court stated that the Mabie decision should not be "indiscriminately expanded to require defense counsel, upon threat of being declared ineffective, to interview all
conceivable witnesses irrespective of the nature or extent of their potential information."

ample, in Commonwealth v. Bailey, 48 the supreme court found trial
counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of the defendant's
intoxication during the crime.' 49 The court noted that "appellant's
intoxication may have been sufficient to negate the specific intent" of
his crime. 150 Consequently, counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to investigate the possibilities of an intoxication defense. 1"'
A criminal defendant has a high probability of success in an
ineffectiveness claim if defense counsel fails to raise a necessary pretrial motion. Instances of ineffective representation at this stage include the failure to demand a speedy trial, 5 2 the failure to make a
timely request for severance, 153 the failure to request a competency
hearing for the defendant, 5 4 as well as other prejudicial omissions
by defense counsel. 155 Generally, a defendant must show that the
pre-trial motion was not frivolous and that defense counsel had no
reasonable basis for failing to raise the motion.' 5 6 For instance, in
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 151 the supreme court found counsel effective
despite counsel's failure to file a motion tosuppress the defendant's
allegedly involuntary confession.' 58 The court observed that since
the confession was voluntary, a motion to suppress would have been
counsel's decision not to file the motion had a reafutile. Therefore
159
sonable basis.
The obligation of counsel to consult with the defendant assumes
147. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 480 Pa. 329, 390 A.2d 166 (1978); Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 359 A.2d 369 (1976).
148. 480 Pa. 329, 390 A.2d 166 (1978).
149. Id at 337, 390 A.2d at 170.
150. Id
151. Id
152. Commonwealth v. Crowley, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 421 A.2d 1129 (1980); Commonwealth v. Webb, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 420 A.2d 703 (1980); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 250 Pa.
Super. Ct. 250, 378 A.2d 921 (1977).
But note that Byrd, suggested that failure to raise a speedy trial violation was ineffectiveness per se. Id at 261-62, 378 A.2d at 926-27 (Van der Voort, J., dissenting). Cf. Commonwealth v. Hairston, 256 Pa. Super. Ct. 153, 157-58, 389 A.2d 647, 648-49 (1978) (Byrd only
applies per se ineffectiveness to violations apparent from the trial record.)
153. Commonwealth v. Von Smith, 486 Pa. 564, 406 A.2d 1034 (1979). Justice Larsen's
dissent, however, argued that a defendant should not automatically receive a new trial "because of a strategic move made by defense counsel." Id at 568, 406 A.2d at 1036 (Larsen, J.,
dissenting). See also Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 80-2-328 (Pa., fied July 10, 1981).
154. Commonwealth v. Mangini, - Pa. -, 425 A.2d 734 (1981).
155. Commonwealth v. Schroth, No. 79-53 (Pa., filed July 10, 1981) (failure to seek a
necessary motion to suppress); Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 393 A.2d 642 (1978)
(failure to seek recusal of a judge following withdrawal of a guilty plea); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 442 Pa. 265, 275 A.2d 98 (1971) (failure to move for a continuance).
156. Commonwealth v. Segers, 479 Pa. 108, 387 A.2d 858 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). As the court noted recently: "A decision by counsel
not to take a particular action does not constitute ineffectiveness if it is based on a reasonable
conclusion that there will be no benefit and is not caused by sloth or ignorance of available
alternatives." Commonwealth v. Yost, 478 Pa. 327, 338, 386 A.2d 956, 962 (1978).
157. 461 Pa. 17, 334 A.2d 610 (1975).
158. Id at 32, 334 A.2d at 618.
159. Id

greater significance in the plea bargaining sphere. 16 The courts
have recognized that the lack of adequate consultation may induce
the defendant to plead guilty without full knowledge of his legal
rights. 16 1 Thus, the courts' analysis of defense counsel's conduct ultimately centers on whether
the defendant voluntarily and knowingly
162
entered a plea of guilty.

An ineffectiveness claim alleging plea bargaining errors requires
63
the defendant to establish that the ineffectiveness induced his plea.
Pennsylvania courts evaluate the "reasonableness of counsel's assessment of his client's case and his advice to the client in light thereof,
including advice as to the implications and consequences of entering
a guilty plea."'" Because a review of counsel's performance in the
plea bargaining sphere entails a subjective evaluation of counsel's
advice, the courts have been reluctant
to sustain a defendant's inef65
fectiveness claim in this area.

2 Trial Conduct.-Counsel's representation at trial provides
the most frequent basis for ineffectiveness claims. Because the courts
are extremely reluctant to question an attorney's trial tactics or advocacy, these claims have the least probability of success. 16 6 During
the course of a trial, defense counsel renders many decisions which
later may be called into question. Pennsylvania courts recognize
that "certain decisions during trial are within the exclusive province
of counsel."'' 67 Moreover, if an independent examination of the record indicates that counsel's trial strategy was reasonably based, that
160. For a detailed discussion of effective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining
sphere, see Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining. What is the Standard?, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 321 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PLEA).
161. See generally Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 359 A.2d 369 (1976).
162. PLEA, supra note 160, at 324-25.
163. Commonwealth v. Ford, 491 Pa. 586, 594, 421 A.2d 1040, 1044 (1980). See also
Commonwealth v. Lutz, - Pa. -, 424 A.2d 1302 (1981); Commonwealth v. Chumley, 482 Pa.
626, 394 A.2d 497 (1978).
164. Commonwealth v. Ward, 442 Pa. 351, 354, 275 A.2d 92, 94 (1971).
165. But see Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 359 A.2d 369 (1976), in which the
court found that counsel's investigation was not sufficient to effectively advise the defendant
for his guilty plea. See also Commonwealth v. Allen, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 420 A.2d 653 (1980).
166. As the court in Commonwealth v. Hudson, 455 Pa. 117, 125, 314 A.2d 231, 235-36
(1974), remarked:
A defendant's case is more effectively advanced by affording counsel the opportunity
to exercise his professional judgment to concede, if deemed advisable, that which
cannot realistically be denied and instead, to concentrate his affirmative efforts on the
best chance for productive challenge. Recognition of the realities of trial requires
that this avenue of advocacy be available to counsel.
Accord, Commonwealth v. Karabin, - Pa. -, 426 A.2d 91 (1981).
167. Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 449 Pa. 584, 588-89, 297 A.2d 456, 458-59 (1972). The
McGrogan court categorized several situations as strategic decisions and therefore "the ultimate choice and responsibility of defense counsel." Id See also Commonwealth v. Witherspoon, 481 Pa. 321, 392 A.2d 1313 (1978) (examination and cross-examination of witnesses is
within counsel's province); Commonwealth v. Goosby, 461 Pa. 229, 336 A.2d 260 (1975) (a
confession admitted without objection in order to establish elements of defense held reasonable strategy).

strategy is imputed to the defendant.16 Despite the hesitancy to find
counsel's trial tactics ineffective, Pennsylvania courts have sustained
a defendant's ineffectiveness claim for counsel's failure to object to
clearly inadmissible and prejudicial testimony, 169 to request crucial
prosecujury instructions, 70 to object to prejudicial remarks by the
72
tor,17 ' and for the commission of other strategic errors.
Another area of trial conduct utilized to raise ineffectiveness
claims is the multiple representation of defendants.17 1 If two or
more defendants are represented by the same attorney and one of the
defendants makes incriminating statements that implicate the other
defendant, then the attorney is representing parties with conflicting
interests and may be unable to render effective assistance. 17 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court recently addressed the issue of multiple
representation and effective assistance of counsel. In Commonwealth
v. Pinhas,'75 the superior court determined that the defendant was
deprived of effective representation because his attorney was representing conflicting interests. In Pinhas, two of the three defendants
168. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 450 Pa. 273, 277, 299 A.2d 608, 610 (1973).
169. See Commonwealth v. Witherspoon, 481 Pa. 321, 392 A.2d 1313 (1978); Commonwealth v. Humphrey, 473 Pa. 533, 375 A.2d 717 (1977); Commonwealth v. Terenda, 451 Pa.
116, 301 A.2d 625 (1973).
170. Commonwealth v. Miller, 448 Pa. 114, 290 A.2d 62 (1972).
171. Commonwealth v. Evans, 479 Pa. 100, 387 A.2d 854 (1978); Commonwealth v. Pfaff,
477 Pa. 461, 384 A.2d 1179 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687
(1977). The supreme court, in Pfaff, observed: "Our advocacy system demands that defense
counsel diligently protect the accused from the prejudice that can be caused by prosecutorial
overreaching. It is defense counsel's duty to bring such remarks to the attention of the trial
court by proper objection." Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 477 Pa. at 466-67, 384 A.2d at 1182.
172. Eg., Commonwealth v. Newmiller, 487 Pa. 410, 409 A.2d 834 (1979) (failure to object to jury instructions); Commonwealth v. Lane, 476 Pa. 258, 382 A.2d 460 (1978) (counsel's
admission of defendant's criminal record); Commonwealth v. Abney, 465 Pa. 304, 350 A.2d
407 (1976) (failure to examine important witnesses); Commonwealth v. Ciotti, - Pa. Super. Ct.
-, 420 A.2d 751 (1980) (failure to object to prejudicial jury poll).
173. For a general discussion of multiple representation, see Wanat, Conflicts ofInterestin
Criminal Cases and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel-The Needfor Change, 10
"RurT.-CAM. L.J. 57 (1978).
174. A defendant will prevail on a dual representation ineffectiveness claim if he can satisfy the four criteria set forth in Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354 (1974).
The four principles of Breaker include the following:
First, "[ilf, in the representation of more than one defendant, a conflict of interest
arises, the mere existence of such conflict vitiates the proceedings, even though no
actual harm results. The potentiality that such harm may result, rather than that
... Second, a defendant
such harm did result, furnishes the appropriate criterion.
must demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually existed at trial, because "dual
representation alone does not amount to a conflict of interest." . . . Third, "[t]o
make the dual representation rise to a true conflict, appellant need not show that
actual harm resulted, . . . but must at least show the possibility of harm ....
Fourth, appellant will satisfy the requirement of demonstrating possible harm, if he
can show, inter alia, "that he had a defense inconsistent with that advanced by the
other client, or that counsel neglected his case in order to give the other client a more
spirited defense."
Id at 344-45, 318 A.2d at 356 (citations omitted) (court's emphasis). See also Commonwealth
v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 371 A.2d 468 (1977); Commonwealth v. Fontana, 490 Pa. 7, 415 A.2d
4 (1980).
175.

- Pa. Super. Ct. -,422 A.2d 1147 (1980).

wanted to plead guilty. Because the prosecutor insisted on the pleas
of all three defendants, the pleas were withdrawn. The court remarked that defense counsel's representation of all three defendants
76
rendered his performance "impossible and, perhaps, unethical."'
3. Post-trialConduct.-Inadequate post-trial conduct presents
another successful target for a defendant attacking his conviction.
The majority of ineffectiveness claims at this stage of the proceedings
address counsel's failure to preserve the defendant's right to appeal.' 77 Initially, a defendant has to prove that counsel's failure to

preserve an issue for appellate review resulted in prejudice to the
defendant. 7 8 Thus, counsel is not ineffective for failing to preserve a
patently frivolous issue.'7 9 If, however, the defendant is able to show
prejudice, then the defendant has the additional burden of proving

that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his inaction.I

Ineffective

post-trial conduct includes the failure to raise prejudicial
prosecutorial remarks in a post-verdict motion, 18 1 the failure to raise
the issue of double jeopardy, 18 2 the failure to raise the issue of trial
counsel's ineffectiveness, 8 3 and the failure to submit an adequate
brief or petition for allowance of a new trial.'8 4

IV.

Critique
Pennsylvania courts have minimized the laudable objectives of

176. Id at -, 422 A.2d at 1153. Flagrant violations of courtroom decorum constitute another category of questionable trial conduct. In Commonwealth v. Mangini, - Pa. Super. Ct.
-, 425 A.2d 734 (1981), the court found that counsel's total representation was so "fraught with
ethical improprieties" that it presented "an overwhelming appearance of ineffectiveness ....
Id at -, 425 A.2d at 738 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mangini, 274 Pa. Super. Ct. 641, 423 A.2d
1311 (1979). But see Commonwealth v. Burton, 491 Pa. 13, 417 A.2d 611 (1980), in which the
supreme court found defense counsel effective despite the trial judge's reprimand of counsel
for alcohol consumption prior to trial. The majority's decision prompted Justice Roberts to
vigorously dissent:
In any case where defense counsel so exhibits signs of drinking as to prompt an on
the record rebuke by the trial judge, these constitutional guarantees plainly have not
been fulfilled. The trial court's displeasure with defense counsel is evident and, if the
smell of alcohol was sufficiently powerful to prompt the court's notice and disapproval, it is not unreasonable to believe that it was perceptible to some or all of the
jurors.
Id at 24, 417 A.2d at 616-17.
177. See generally Commonwealth v. Hertzog, - Pa. -, 425 A.2d 329 (1981); Commonwealth v. Shore, 487 Pa. 534, 410 A.2d 740 (1980); Commonwealth v. Yocham, 483 Pa. 478,
397 A.2d 766 (1979); Commonwealth v. Johnson, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 421 A.2d 737 (1980).
178. See generally Commonwealth v. Shore, 487 Pa. 534, 410 A.2d 740 (1980).
179. Id See note 117 and accompanying text supra
180. See generally Commonwealth ex rel Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d
349 (1967).
181. Commonwealth v. Caesar, 478 Pa. 575, 387 A.2d 471 (1978); Commonwealth v.
Townsell, 474 Pa. 563, 379 A.2d 98 (1977).
182. Commonwealth v. Wideman, 453 Pa. 119, 306 A.2d 894 (1973).
183. See generally Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 121, 362 A.2d 324 (1976).
184. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 371 A.2d 468 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Parker, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 422 A.2d 509 (1980).

the "reasonable basis" test through inconsistent interpretations and

reluctant applications.

85

An analysis of Pennsylvania case law sug-

gests that the courts will only condemn representation that is egregious and overwhelmingly prejudicial.' 86 Further, the infrequent
success of ineffectiveness claims is indicative of the court's reluctance
to question defense counsel's actions.' 8 7
Similar to the "reasonably effective assistance" test, the "reasonable basis" test typifies the failure of courts to construct a workable
standard to measure defense counsel's performance. 188 The "reasonable basis" test suffers from the fatal flaw of incorporating within the
test the very term to be defined. 189 The test begs the question of
what constitutes a "reasonable basis" for counsel's actions. 90 Instead of prescribing specific guidelines for the court and the attorney
to follow, Pennsylvania courts have determined a "reasonable basis"
by subjectively examining the entire circumstances of the case. 19'
An examination of the circumstances of each case, however, en-

tails a due process analysis similar to the "farce and mockery"

test.' 92 Although Pennsylvania courts have equated effective representation with the right to counsel,' 93 due process concepts fre185. See generally notes 194-200 and 203-206 and accompanying text infra.
186. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burton, 491 Pa. 13, 417 A.2d 611 (1980) (counsel found
effective despite trial judge's reprimand for alcohol consumption); Commonwealth v. Garcia,
478 Pa. 406, 387 A.2d 46 (1978) (effective assistance despite late appointment); Commonwealth
ex rel Johnson v. Russell, 428 Pa. 440, 239 A.2d 399 (1968) (effective assistance despite appointment of counsel on the day of the trial).
187. For example, Judge Watkins recently stated in Commonwealth v. Albert, - Pa.
Super. Ct. -, -, 426 A.2d 678, 679 (1981) that "[ilneffective assistance of counsel has become
the last ditch ploy of defendants in criminal cases and should not be encouraged" (emphasis
added).
188. See notes 40-56 and accompanying text supra. But see Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa.
479, 497, 406 A.2d 735, 744-45 (1979) (O'Brien, J., dissenting), in which the "reasonable basis"
test is compared with a negligence standard: "The standard in Pennsylvania for assaying the
effectiveness of counsel's representation of a criminally accused approximates mere negligence. . . . In no small number of cases we have determined counsel not to have met even
this less stringent test."
It is doubtful that the Maroney court, in creating the "reasonable basis" test, considered
employing a negligence standard. Indeed, the first negligence standard did not appear until
1970 in Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 .(3d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
189. See generally note 52 supra.
190. Since counsel conceivably has a reasonable basis for every act or omission, a reviewing court must exercise a wide range of discretion in disposing of the ineffectiveness claim.
Consequently, the capacity for each judge to incorporate his own notions of attorney competency into the decision increases. See WAIVER DocrRINE, supra note 120, at 253-54.
191. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burton, 491 Pa. 13, 417 A.2d 611 (1980); Commonwealth
v. Ryder, 488 Pa. 404, 412 A.2d 572 (1980); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 449 Pa. 345, 296 A.2d
823 (1972); Commonwealth v. Irby, 445 Pa. 248, 284 A.2d 738 (1971); Commonwealth ex re.
Johnson v. Russell, 428 Pa. 440, 239 A.2d 399 (1968).
The absence of uniform criteria to determine effective representation inevitably results in
inconsistent, ad hoc decision making by the courts. Indeed, Justice Larsen recently remarked
that "allegations of ineffectiveness" must be determined on a "case by case" basis. Commonwealth v. Pettus, -- Pa. -, -, 424 A.2d 1332, 1335 (1981).
192. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
193. Commonwealth v. Wideman, 453 Pa. 119, 306 A.2d 894 (1973); Commonwealth ex
re. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).

quently appear in the decisions.' 94 Indeed, the courts have evaluated
counsel's representation in terms of "gross error"'' 95 or "serious derelictions."' 96 These terms signify that the courts will only examine
the most extreme instances of ineffectiveness. 97
Conversely, several decisions illustrate the court's shift to a prescriptive approach. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has incorporated specific guidelines, such as the ABA Standards for the Defense
Function, into several decisions. 98 Nevertheless, the court's intermittent application of specific guidelines mitigates the value of a prescriptive approach. 199 Absent a consistent application of specific
requirements, defense counsel lacks a predictable gauge to regulate
his or her conduct. 2° °
The court's failure to provide substantive guidelines for counsel's performance merely encourages criminal defendants to file ineffectiveness claims. 2 ' Utilizing a "hit or miss" approach, criminal
defendants, for lack of a more appropriate objection, often file "boilerplate" allegations of ineffectiveness.2" 2 Inundated with these
claims, Pennsylvania courts are reluctant to reverse a defendant's
194. See notes 195 & 196 infra,
195. Commonwealth v. Brown, 443 Pa. 21, 27, 275 A.2d 332, 334 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Moroz, 444 Pa. 493, 496, 281 A.2d 842, 844 (1971).
196. Commonwealth v. Ward, 442 Pa. 351,353, 275 A.2d 92, 94 (1971).
197. Another semantic variation of the "reasonable basis" test is in Commonwealth v.
Ganss, 440 Pa. 602, 606, 271 A.2d 224, 226 (1970) in which the court considered whether
counsel's actions were "within the permissible range of prudent representation of his client's
interests." Accord, Commonwealth v. Hill, 450 Pa. 477, 301 A.2d 587 (1973). Although the
Ganss test theoretically approximates a standard closer to negligence concepts than the "reasonable basis" test, it was applied so few times that the potential benefits from this standard
never appeared. See also Commonwealth v. Borelli, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 432 A.2d 1067 (1981)
(appears to cite a new test).
198. Eg., Commonwealth v. Fontana, 490 Pa. 7, 415 A.2d 4 (1980) (incorporating § 3.5);
Commonwealth v. Yocham, 483 Pa. 478, 397 A.2d 766 (1979) (incorporating § 4.1); Commonwealth v. Witherspoon, 481 Pa. 321, 392 A.2d 1313 (1978) (incorporating § 5.2(b)); Commonwealth v. Hare, 475 Pa. 234, 380 A.2d 330 (1977) (incorporating § 5.1(b)); Commonwealth v.
Webster, 466 Pa. 314, 353 A.2d 372 (1975) (incorporating § 8.2, 8.3, 8.4); Commonwealth v.
Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 334 A.2d 610 (1975) (incorporating § 5.2(a)(b)). See also Commonwealth v.
Bailey, 480 Pa. 329, 390 A.2d 166 (1978).
199. See note 78 supra.
200. See COMMENT, supra note 6, at 765. For a discussion of possible disciplinary intervention by the courts, see notes 246-254 and accompanying text infra
201. For statistics and a brief discussion on the proliferation of ineffectiveness claims, see
notes 131-140 and accompanying text supra.
202. See note 126 supra. The court's clear disfavor for "boilerplate" ineffectiveness claims
appeared in Commonwealth v. Pettus, - Pa. -, -, 424 A.2d 1332, 1335 (1981), in which Justice
Larsen stated that "[a]ssertions of ineffectiveness in a vacuum cannot be ineffectiveness ...
This court will no longer consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the abstract."
Concerned with the continuous abuse of the PCHA by prisoners as well as the pending
repeal of the PCHA, see Act of June 26, 1981, P.L. No. 41 (H.B. 41) (providing for the continuation of the PCHA until June 27, 1982), the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee recently
recommended to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the adoption of new rules governing postconviction proceedings. 11 PA. BULL. 1781-1796 (1981). These rules attempt to eliminate frivolous, "boilerplate" ineffectiveness claims by requiring the petitioner to state the facts and
allegations which would entitle him to relief instead of simply checking a box, as under the
present procedure. Compare id with note 126, supra.

conviction without clear proof of prejudice resulting from counsel's
acts or omissions.2 °3
Unfortunately, the court's procedural interpretation of the reviewability of ineffectiveness claims has substantially contributed to
the increase of these appeals.2°4 Judicial uncertainty and misapplication of fundamental doctrines of appellate review have perpetuated ineffectiveness claims.2" 5 Since the court's evaluation of these
claims is distorted by the sheer quantity of the allegations, a criminal
defendant rarely prevails on appeal. 1°
203. For a review of the burden of proof requirements for a criminal defendant, see notes
108-119 and accompanying text supra.
204. For a synopsis of reviewability, see notes 120-140 and accompanying text supra.
205. For a criticism of court misapplications of doctrines of appellate review, see Commonwealth v. Alexander, - Pa. -, 432 A.2d 182 (1981) (Nix, J., & Flaherty, J., concurring in
separate opinions) (both objecting to Justice Larsen's majority opinion which provides additional factors for appellate review of PCHA ineffectiveness claims); Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980) (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (suggesting a new
reviewability test); Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 393 A.2d 642 (1978) (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting a return to the "fundamental error" doctrine); Commonwealth v.Caesar, 478 Pa. 575, 387 A.2d 471 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the court has
"come full circle" to the "fundamental error" doctrine). See also note 139 supra and WAIVER
DOCTRINE, supra note 120, at 252.
206. Justice Flaherty's distaste for ineffectiveness claims was apparent in Commonwealth
v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980) (Flaherty, J., dissenting), in which he commented upon the multiplicity of PCHA petitions:
It is time for the Court to realize that we have inadvertently created a monster of
inefficiency and judicial wastefulness in our past interpretations of the PCHA. That
convicted prisoners, as a routine matter, should file endless petitions was never contemplated under the PCHA .... The purpose of the act was to facilitate, in certain
circumstances, additional review of convictions, not to fill the leisure hours of prisoners by permitting them to file endless post-conviction petitions. In fact.
the act
specifically provides that a petitioner is entitled to only one petition.
Id at 249, 251, 420 A.2d at 435, 436 (court's emphasis). Justice Flaherty, positing a different
approach to appellate review of ineffectiveness claims, suggests limiting collateral review to
those cases containing "a colorable due process claim significantly implicating the truth determining process, which, were it unaddressed by the Court, could have the effect of imprisoning
an innocent person. Id at 252, 420 A.2d at 438 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
The "innocence" test postulated by Justice Flaherty has caused a split among the members of
the supreme court. Justices Flaherty, Kauffman and Nix support the "innocence" standard.
Justice Larsen, in his recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Alexander, No. 79-190 (Pa.,
filed July 9, 1981), considers Justice Flaherty's new test an inflexible approach to the review of
PCHA petitions. Justice Larsen would have the PCHA court consider "all the myriad facts
and circumstances surrounding the petition as to the decision to hold a hearing on a second (or
a later successive) petition..." Id at 13. Justice Larsen noted that the court should consider
the factors suggested by Justice Flaherty in his two-fold test as well as the following factors:
1)The length of time between the occurrence of the asserted error and the filing of
the petition, and the explanation for any delay.
2) Whether the collateral attack follows judgment of sentence imposed upon a plea of
guilty.
3) Abuse of remedy.
4) Prejudice
5) To what extent does a second (or later successive) petition simply allege a new or
different legal theory for supporting an issue already decided against petitioner.
Id. at 13-16. Justices Flaherty, Kauffman and Nix disagreed with Justice Larsen inlexander,
by noting that Justice Larsen's opinion merely provides an "unnecessary complexity" in an
"area that certainly does not require further obfuscation." Id. at 2 (Nix, J., concurring), at 2
(Flaherty, J., concurring).
It is this writer's opinion that Justice Flaherty's "innocence" test is a significant and progressive step towards achieving a finality to the PCHA litigation that plagues the appellate

Providing criminal defendants with effective assistance of counsel necessitates the formulation and application of a prescriptive
standard to evaluate the quality of defense representation. 20 7 A prescriptive test would enable the courts to police counsel's performance
and would provide attorneys with a predictable rule to promote selfregulation. 20 8
Realistically, a prescriptive test should not interfere with defense counsel's trial tactics and strategy. 20 9 Consequently, a flexible
standard predicated on comparative legal practices would minimize
the rigidity of a prescriptive test while ensuring defendants maximum protection during the course of the trial.21 0 Further, procedural limitations to eliminate frivolous claims and to promote a finality
to litigation would lessen the burdensome caseload of the appellate
courts. A reduction of ineffectiveness claims would promote a
heightened judicial awareness of attorney incompetency and may
encourage courts to rectify that problem. 21 '
In the final analysis, the protection of a criminal defendant's
sixth amendment rights must come from the judicial system. A test
for effective assistance of counsel must further the constitutional requisites of a fair trial through effective representation. Implementation of the test should encourage professional responsibility and
accountability in the criminal defense arena.2 12 The current test for
effective assistance of counsel in Pennsylvania lacks the necessary
attributes to fulfill these obligations. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
supreme court to "re-examine the standard for determining when a
defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel ... .
courts. Justice Flaherty's test, however, does not provide specoc limitations on reviewability
of ineffectiveness claims. The nebulous concepts contained in his two-fold test provide the
appellate courts with yet another procedural rule to misapply. If the court is intent upon
limiting the reviewablfity of ineffectiveness claims, thereby promoting a finality to the litigation, then it should provide rigid procedural guidelines incapable of varied interpretations.
See Procedural Proposal-Reviewability, notes 219 & 226-231 and accompanying text infra.

For a review of the supreme court split on the reviewability of multiple PCHA petitions,
see Commonwealth v. Alexander, No. 79-190 (Pa. filed July 9, 1981); Commonwealth v. McNeal, - Pa. -, 426 A.2d 606 (1981); Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, - Pa. -, 425 A.2d 1100
(1981); Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980).

For an examination of the recent judicial intervention into the PCHA arena, see note 202
supra.
207. See generally DEFECTS, supra note 47 and STANDARD, supra note 6, at 192-98.
208. Id See notes 78-91 and accompanying text supra
209. See note 91 supra
210. See notes 57-77 and accompanying text 5upra
211. See DEFECTS, supra note 47.
212. See notes 234-263 and accompanying text infra
213. Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 246, 420 A.2d 431, 434 (1980) (Larsen, J.,
concurring).

V. Proposals
.4.

Effective Assistance Standard

A workable standard for evaluating defense counsel's performance necessarily implies a recognition of the conflicting interests involved.2" 4 A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to
effective representation, 215 but a prophylactic rule should not inhibit
the freedom of an attorney to pursue certain trial strategies.21 6 Finally, a functional standard must promote some semblance of judicial economy and a finality to litigation.2" 7
With these criteria in mind, an efficient and functional effective
assistance test would provide the following:
218

Substantive Proposal
1
Counsel will be found ineffective for failure to exercise the skill
and knowledge normally possessed by the reasonably competent
attorney engaged in the practice of criminal law.
Reasonable competent assistance includes, but is not limited to,
the following basic duties:
(1) Counsel should confer with the client without delay. In so doing, counsel should question the defendant for all legally relevant
in ormation to ascertain potential defenses.
(2) Counsel has the duty to conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case. Counsel's duty to investigate also includes adequate legal research. Counsel's duty to investigate includes interviewing both prosecution and defense witnesses when
such witnesses are accessible. Counsel's duty to investigate exists
regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to counsel of
facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead
guilty.
(3) At the earliest opportunity, counsel has the duty to disclose to
the defendant any interest in or connection with the case or any
other matter that might be relevant to the defendant's selection of
the lawyer to represent him or her.
(4) Counsel has the duty to advise the defendant of all aspects of
the case, including a candid estimate of the probable outcome.
Consultation with the defendant at this stage should occur after
counsel has had the opportunity to investigate the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
(5) Counsel has the duty to inform the defendant of his or her
legal rights concerning (a) what pleas to enter; (b) jury trial waivers; and (c) whether to testify in his or her own behalf. Counsel's
214. See note 2 supra.
215. See notes 14-27 and accompanying text supra.
216. See note 91 supra
217. See note 206 supra
218. The substantive proposal combines the Moore test of "community standards," see
notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra, with specified duties suggested by the AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION'S (ABA) STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (2d ed.) (Tentative Draft Ap-

proved, Feb. 12, 1979) (§ 4-3.2,4-4.1,4-3.5(a), 4-5.1(a), 4-5.2(a), 4-6-1,4-3.8,4-7.1(a), 4-7.10,48.2(b) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].

duty in this area is only to inform the defendant of his or her legal
rights and possible consequences. The ultimate decision must be
voluntarily and knowingly made by the accused. Further, counsel
should not intentionally understate or overstate tke risks, hazards
or prospects of the case to exert undue influence on the accused's
decision.
(6) Counsel has the duty to prepare all applicable pre-trial motions that may lead to an early disposition of the case. Counsel
will not be ineffective, however, for failing to file a patently frivolous motion.
(7) Counsel has the duty to keep the defendant informed of the
developments of the case and the progress of preparing the defense.
(8) Counsel has the duty to conduct all necessary preparation for
presentation of a defense at trial. Adequate preparation includes
the necessary time for reflection to prepare the strategy of the case.
(9) Counsel has the duty to engage in professional conduct at trial.
Such conduct necessarily includes proper courtroom decorum. Intoxication or somnolence at trial is not proper courtroom decorum
and cannot be said to be in the best interests of the defendant.
(10) Counsel has the duty to present appropriate motions after
verdict and before sentence to protect the defendant's rights.
(11) Counsel has the duty to preserve the defendant's rights on
appeal.
2 19

2. ProceduralProposal.
(1) Burden of Proof andPrejudice
A defendant raising a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel has the
burden of proving that counsel either (1) failed to perform one or
more of the basic duties or (2) failed to exercise the ordinary skill
and care of the reasonably competent criminal attorney.
If the defendant sustains the burden of proving that counselfailed
to perform one or more ofthe basic duties, then the burden shits to
the prosecution to prove harmless error from counsel's ineffectiveness.
If the defendant proves that counselfailed to exercise the ordinary
skill and care of the reasonably competent criminalattorney, then
the defendant also must prove that he or she was prejudiced
thereby.
(2) Reviewability
A claim questioning trial or appellate counsel's effectiveness may
only be raised by one PCHA petition. The PCHA court will determine whether the defendant's claim is frivolous. If it appears
from the trial record, or through an appropriate evidentiary hearing, that counsel was ineffective, then the PCHA court may reverse the defendant's conviction, and may grant a new trial. If the
PCHA court determines that the claim is frivolous, or that counsel
exercised ordinary skill and care of the reasonably competent
criminal attorney, or fulfilled the minimum duties, then the PCHA
court will dismiss the petition. A determination by the PCHA
219. The procedural proposal is this writer's analysis and possible solution to the
problems created by misinterpretations of the waiver doctrine as applied to ineffectiveness
claims. See notes 108-140 and accompanying text supra and notes 226-231 and accompanying
text infra

court is reviewable only by the superior court. The superior
court's determination to sustain or reverse the PCHA court's determination is non-reviewable. A defendant raising a claim three
years after the date of defendant's sentencing may not appeal the
determination of the PCHA court. Further, a second (or successive) petition will be reviewed and, within the discretion of the
PCHA court, summarily dismissed.
3. Implementation Proposal22 °
A judicial determination that defense counsel has provided ineffective or incompetent representation to a criminal defendant results in commencement of a complaint against the attorney in
accordance with the complaint procedures of the Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
A copy of this determination will also be forwarded to the authorities responsible for appointing attorneys in criminal cases so that
these ineffective or incompetent attorneys will not receive future
appointments.
The substantive proposal combines a tort malpractice test with
specific duties for the practitioner and the court to follow.2"' Reliance on a tort malpractice test provides the court with a familiar
comparative approach to professional conduct, thereby employing
more objective criteria than Pennsylvania's present "reasonable basis" test.2 ' Further, the inherent weakness of the suggested tort malpractice test, which fails to specify the parameters of a reasonably
competent criminal attorney, is virtually eliminated by the list of duties for defense counsel and the court to follow. 2 2 3 The prescriptive
guidelines of this substantive proposal focus on counsel's representation in the pre-trial and post-trial stages of the case when counsel's
actions are easily categorized.224 Consequently, counsel's trial strategy is not jeopardized by restrictive guidelines and the adversary system's structural balance remains intact.22 5
The procedural burden of proof proposal requires the prosecution to prove harmless error from counsel's violation of one of the
specific duties. Although a requirement that the prosecution prove
harmless error from defense counsel's inactions places an extremely
220.

For further clarification see notes 246-254 and accompanying text infra.

221.

See notes 57-77 and 78-91 and accompanying text supra.

222. See note 65 supra
223. For an illustration of the flaws in the "reasonably competent attorney" test, see notes
72-77 and accompanying text supra. For a review of the advantages of the checklist approach,
see notes 86-91 and accompanying text supra.

224. See note 91 supra Specific duties and guidelines for an attorney do not impose an
unbearable burden on the defense since the suggested duties are those that any reasonably
competent attorney would undertake. Further, the trend toward closer judicial scrutiny of
defense counsel's actions should put all attorneys on notice that their representation is being
monitored.

225. See notes 2, 84, & 91 supra In the trial stragegy sphere, defense counsel should keep
a record of disagreements between counsel and client to facilitate fact finding processes in
appellate review. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 218, at 4-5.2(c). See also notes 244 & 245 and
accompanying text infra

difficult, if not impossible, burden on the state,2 26 this shift in the
burden of proof is justified when considering that counsel's violation
of one of the specific duties may have played a significant role in the
defendant's conviction.2 27 Conversely, allegations of ineffectiveness
involving counsel's acts or omissions that are not included in the prescribed duties often involve counsel's representation during the
course of the trial. Because it is difficult to evaluate counsel's trial
strategy, a requirement that the defendant prove prejudicial impact
is justified.22 8
The procedural reviewability proposal encourages judicial economy and finality to litigation. Since a large portion of ineffectiveness
claims raised on direct appeal are remanded for an evidentiary hearing,229 the suggested proposal eliminates the appellate court's initial
review of the claim. Further, the proposal shifts the burden of reviewing any ineffectiveness claims from the appellate courts to the
PCHA forum, thereby eliminating the need for direct appellate review of frivolous ineffectiveness appeals. 23 0 Additionally, the imposition of a three year time limitation on ineffectiveness claims deters
criminal defendants from raising "boilerplate" allegations several
years after their conviction. 23'
226. See Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Who Bears the Burden of Proof? 29
BAYLOR L. REV. 29, 49-53 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BURDEN]. Similar problems arise with
the adversary system's structural balance, see note 85 and accompanying text supraz
For a summary of the allocation of the burden of proof in ineffectiveness cases, see note
60 supra.
227. The government should carry the burden of proving harmless error because it is important to avoid the constitutional infringements caused by inadequate representation. Pretrial and post-trial conduct is not concerned with strategical decisions but with important procedural guarantees. Without complete judicial protection, the result is infringement upon
criminal defendants' constitutional rights. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); BURDEN SUpra note 226, at 48-49; PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at 72-85.
228. See notes 244 & 245 and accompanying text infra; BURDEN, supra note 226, at 48-49.
Since trial strategy is necessarily difficult to evaluate without utilization of a hindsight approach, it is suggested that the defendant must prove prejudicial impact from counsel's trial
conduct. Further, considering the quantity of frivolous ineffectiveness claims attacking counsel's trial strategy, prejudicial impact is imperative.
229. See WAIVER DOCTRINE, supra note 120, at 248 and note 63 supra. As one commentator observed: "Because ineffective assistance claims involve ascertaining counsel's purpose,
such remands should be frequent. The result is that both the trial and appellate courts participate in the adjudicatory process of ineffective assistance claims." WAIVER DOCTRINE, supra
note 120, at 248-49.
230. Since the PCHA is the forum to decide whether an ineffectiveness claim is "frivolous
and without any support from the record," shifting the burden to the PCHA courts to review
all ineffectiveness claims is warranted by administrative efficiency and judicial economy. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-9 (Purdon Supp. 1976). Since most ineffectiveness claims raised
on direct appeal are re-routed through the PCHA avenues for the necessary evidentiary hearing, the suggested proposal centralizes the procedure for processing such claims. Additionally,
this suggested proposal comports with Justice Flaherty's rationale in Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980). See note 206 supra.
23 1. The concept of a time limitation on post conviction proceedings is not novel. Chief
Justice Bell, in Commonwealth v. Hill, 444 Pa. 75, 279 A.2d 170 (1971), suggested the following proposal:
[A] person convicted of murder or any other felony (1) shall have the right to file

Although the substantive proposal may encourage criminal defendants to attack defense counsel's representation with greater frequency than the present "reasonable basis" test, the reviewability
proposal eliminates a substantial portion of the meritless ineffectiveness claims.2 32 Thus, the intended result is greater judicial efficiency,

which promotes a closer scrutiny of meritorious ineffectiveness
claims. Although the central focus of the proposal is the protection
of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights, an underlying theme
of the proposal is the strengthening of the criminal defense bar
through effective advocacy. The implementation proposal encourages, if not compels, competent criminal defense representation.2 3 3
The following implementation techniques and remedies further ensure effective legal representation.
B. Implementation Techniques

Participation by the bench, the bar and the public in implementation of the preceding proposal provides further assurance that a
criminal defendant will receive quality defense representation. Judicial intervention techniques at all stages of counsel's representation
afford a criminal defendant maximum constitutional protections and
eliminate the need for appellate review of every conviction. Moreover, remedial mechanisms, when applied to ineffective attorneys,
discourage repetitions of incompetent defense representation.
motions for a new trial and/or arrest of judgment and/or any other motion or petition within ten days after conviction, and (2) shall have the right to (a) one and only
one direct counseled appeal, which must be taken within thirty days after a judgment
of sentence or other final Order, and (b) in the absence of "extraordinary circumstances," one and only one counseled appeal from a PCHA hearing or writ of habeas
corpus or similar proceeding which must be taken within two years after the entry of a
judgment of sentence or other final Order.
Id at 83, 279 A.2d at 174 (Bell, J., dissenting) (Court's emphasis).
The supreme court's desire for a procedure similar to Chief Justice Bell's is illustrated by
the court's obvious distaste for PCHA claims. See note 206 supra.
A temporal limitation on the reviewability of ineffectiveness claims also comports with
Justice Roberts' comments: "It is evident that the orderly administration of justice requires
that a criminal controversy, like any other litigation, [must] some day come to an end." Commonwealth v. Slavik, 449 Pa. 424, 432, 297 A.2d 920, 924 (1972).
232. See notes 230-33 supra.
233. Undoubtedly, the implementation proposal is the most stringent component of the
entire ineffectiveness proposal. Indeed, most attorneys would probably refuse court appointments if this proposal were implemented. Nevertheless, the court's proper implementation of
the substantive and procedural proposal could easily reduce the substantial number of ineffectiveness claims, making court appointments in criminal cases less hazardous and therefore
more attractive.
Support for such a proposal would surely come from the city and county district attorney's offices throughout Pennsylvania since these offices are often confronted with "competent" attorneys who will "go south" or "take a dive" so that their former client's conviction will
be reversed. In fact, the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office has a policy that allows the
District Attorney, in his discretion, to forward ineffectiveness determinations to the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the leniency of the Disciplinary Board virtually negates the potential deterrent effect that the District Attorney's policy might have on
other criminal defense attorneys. See note 253 infra.

1 Intervention by the Court-Pre-trial.
-Preventive measures
instituted by the appropriate judicial2 3 4 or legislative23 5 body lessen

the need for appellate review of an attorney's performance and ensure initial competent representation. Pre-trial certification, 2 36 criminal defense checklists,2 37 and informal supervision of counsel's pretrial preparation 238 are suggested precautionary devices to safeguard
a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. Increased financial support for court appointed attorneys, 239 as well as caseload limitations
for public defenders, 24 0 are additional methods of encouraging effective representation.
2. Intervention by the Court-Trial-Judicial
intervention
during the course of the trial is a useful mechanism for monitoring
defense representation. 24 ' Because inadequate preparation or investigation is frequently the source of ineffective assistance, early inter-

vention by the trial judge by granting a continuance of the trial may
prompt counsel to prepare an effective defense for the accused.24 2

Moreover, quick intervention promotes judicial
economy by elimi2 43

nating the need for an ineffectiveness appeal.
Despite the obvious advantages of judicial intervention during
234. See note 237 infra for examples of judicial pre-trial policies.
235. Recently, Senator Edward Kennedy of the United States Senate and Representative
Peter Rodino of the United States House of Representatives proposed companion bills to establish a Center for Defense Services. S. 2170, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); H.R. 6875, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The Center for Defense Services was to provide uniform, high quality
defense legal assistance to indigent defendants. Unfortunately, both bills died at the close of
the 96th Congress.
Pennsylvania has statutory requirements for the admission of attorneys to the state bar.
See generally 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2521 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
236. For a critical evaluation of pre-trial qualification programs to improve advocacy in
the federal courts, see REPORT AND TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE TO
CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS TO THE JUDI-

79 F.R.D. 187 (1979) (DEvITT COMMITTEE).
South Carolina courts, for example, recommend that all new admittees to the bar have
eleven "trial experiences" before solo work is permitted. These "trial experiences" are similar
to internship programs. See Littlejohn, Ensuring Lawyer Competency.- The South CarolinaApproach, 64 JUDICATURE 109 (1980). See also Crickard, Judges Educate Inexperience TrialAttorneys, 67 A.B.A.J. 10 (1981) (Los Angeles mock trial program). For an overview of Peer
Review Committees, See THE L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 19, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
For the suggestion that special licenses or law school programs be required to prepare
criminal defense attorneys, see Bazelon, supra note 6, at 13-14.
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

237.

See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:

REPORT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

ACT, 36 F.R.D. 277, 338 (1965) (review of Maryland District Court's program of defense
checklists). See note 79 supra
238. For an excellent analysis of judicial supervision of counsel's performance in the pretrial stage, see Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93
HARv. L. REV. 633 (1980).
239. See Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973) and
Gard, supra note 6, at 503.
240. See Bazelon, supra note 6, at 12. Bazelon suggests removal of the power of court
appointment from judges and the placement of such power in an independent agency.
241. See Schwarzer, supra note 238, at 661.
242.

COMMENT, supra note 6, at 773.

243. Id

the trial, certain underlying difficulties prevent absolute implementation of this technique. The harmful impact of continuous interrup-.
tions during defense counsel's representation inhibits further
litigation strategy, removes the judge from his traditional neutral
role and jeopardizes the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. 2" Thus, in the absence of a timely intervention, a trial
judge should only intervene if counsel's incompetence clearly undermines the defendant's case.245
3. Intervention by the Appellate Courts-Remedies.-Currently, the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
does not provide a remedy for criminal defendants alleging ineffective assistance of counsel until a reviewing court has made a final
adjudication of incompetency. 2 " Once the appellate court has determined that counsel was ineffective, a defendant may institute a complaint.2 47 Realistically, however, most defendants never file
favorable determination has
complaints because the appellate court's
248
objectives.
satisfied the defendant's
Under the suggested implementation proposal, appellate intervention plays a critical role in deterring future incompetent representation. Implementation requires the commencement of disciplinary
proceedings by the final adjudicatory body once the court has determined counsel incompetent. 4 9 This procedure is a substitute for disciplinary action initiated by the defendant. 25 ° Thus, the Disciplinary
Board processes the court's determination as it would process the
244. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 27, 334 A.2d 610, 615 (1975); Schwarzer, supra
note 238, at 662-64.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. N.Y. 1979), in which the

trial judge declared a mistrial and ordered that new counsel be retained for a criminal defendant who was represented by an eighty-three year old attorney who had hearing problems and
failed to assert several necessary pre-trial motions.
For instances in which appellate courts commented upon the trial judge's failure to intervene, see United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1134 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (defense counsel
advised the judge that he could take only a few minutes for summation because he had to
move his car by five o'clock); United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (defense counsel based his entire defense on an 1895 decision and, when requested to provide
recent precedent, stated that he could not locate a Shepard's citator). See generally Bazelon,
supra note 6, at 773.
246. On April 13, 1973, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
passed the following resolution:

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is hereby directed to dismiss any complaints received from persons convicted of crimes alleging professional incompetence on the
part of an attorney who represented him in connection with his trial unless there has
been a final adjudication of incompetency in a proceeding under the Post Conviction
Hearing Act.
Disciplinary Board Meeting, April 13, 1973, DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA.

247. Id
248. See Gard, supra note 6, at 500.
249. For a similar approach, see Bines, supra note 6, at 976. See also note 233 supra.
250. See notes 260-263 and accompanying text Mfra

traditional defendant's complaint.2 5'
With the knowledge that disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against counsel for failure to provide adequate representation,
defense attorneys will be compelled to furnish optimal assistance.2 52

Yet, a realistic appraisal of the Disciplinary Board suggests that ineffectiveness complaints, for the most part, will be summarily dismissed.2 5 3 Nevertheless, the potential for disciplinary sanctions for
incompetent criminal representation may provide a substantial deterrent to future negligent conduct.25 4

4. Retrospective Action by the Defendant
(a) Legal mapractice.-A defendant can sue ineffective counsel under a theory of negligence, breach of contract, or a combination of tort and contract. 255 The elements of a legal malpractice
action in Pennsylvania were set forth in Schenkel v. Monheit. 25 6 The
Schenkel court required "(1) [t]he employment of the attorney or

other basis for duty; (2) the failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge; and (3) that such
negligence was the prox257
imate cause of damage to the plaintiff.
A malpractice suit is a suggested remedy for those criminal defendants who received overwhelmingly incompetent representation.
Because the causation requirement entails a showing that but for the
attorney's negligence the defendant would have prevailed in the
258
trial, criminal defendants rarely succeed in legal malpractice suits.
If, however, the defendant prevailed in the new trial after his appeal,
251. Id
252. See note 91 supra
253. To date, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has been
notably lax in disciplining attorneys who shirk their obligations to their clients. From 1972
through May 30, 1981, the Disciplinary Board has handled approximately 15,959 complaints
against attorneys. A total of 15,140 of those complaints were acted upon via dismissal or
action. Although it is extremely difficult to obtain exact statistics because of the continuous
flux of complaints, a critical analysis of the total complaints that have eventually necessitated a
hearing presents a picture of leniency. A total of 331 complaints from the grand total of 15,959
were disposed of by the following sanctions: dismissal = 48; informal admonition = 28; private reprimand = 55; probation = 3; public censure = 39; suspension = 87; disbarment = 71.
STATISTICS FROM THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
STATISTICAL COMPILATION, TABLE 7: DISCIPLINE DETERMINED AFTER BOARD OR SUPREME
COURT ADJUDICATION FOR VAIOUS PERIODS-FROM 1972 TO MAY 31, 1981. Further, there
has been a steady decline in the frequency of sanctions since 1977. Id

For an explanation of the sanctions, see 204 PA. CODE § 85.8 (Rules of the Disciplinary
Board).
254. See note 91 supra.
255. See generaly R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1977); Schnidman &
Salzler, The LegalMalpracticeDilemma." WillNew Standardsof CarePlaceProfessionalLiability InsuranceBeyond the Reach of the Specialist, 45 U. CINN. L. REV. 541 (1976); Schwarzer,
supra note 238, at 646-49; Zilly, Recent Developments in Legal MalpracticeLitigation, 6 LrrIGATION 8 (1979).

256.

266 Pa. Super. Ct. 396, 405 A.2d 493 (1979).

257. Id at 399, 405 A.2d at 494. Accord, Duke and Co. v. Anderson, - Pa. Super. Ct. -,
418 A.2d 613 (1980); Guy v. Liederbach, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 421 A.2d 333 (1980).

258.

See note 255 supra

was the proxithen the court may infer that the attorney's negligence
259
conviction.
initial
defendant's
mate cause of the
(b) Disciolinaryproceedings.-A defendant is encouraged to
commence disciplinary action against incompetent counsel. 26° The
Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court requires a
complaint to be in writing, to be signed by the complainant, and to
contain a brief statement of the facts surrounding the attorney's misconduct. 26 ' The Disciplinary Board then reviews the complaint to
determine whether further action should be taken against the attorney. Disciplinary sanctions include disbarment, suspension, public
censure, probation, private reprimand, and private informal admonition.2 62 Although a defendant achieves negligible personal satisfaction from commencement of disciplinary proceedings against the
ineffective attorney, the potential deterrent effect of such action assures future competent representation.2 6 3
VI.

Conclusion

Effective representation by criminal defense counsel is a constitutional prerequisite to a fair trial. Appropriate judicial review of an
attorney's performance can ensure the protection of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights. To safeguard these constitutional
rights, many jurisdictions have adopted specific criteria of effective
representation to evaluate legal representation. 2 4 Despite this current trend, the Pennsylvania judiciary refuses to re-evaluate its effective assistance standard.2 65 Inconsistent, ad hoc judicial
determinations result, thereby depriving the criminal defense bar of
a predictable gauge to regulate their conduct. 266 Most significantly,
the absence of defined procedural boundaries for ineffectiveness
claims allows criminal defendant's to attack the competency of defense counsel almost on a daily basis.2 67
259. See note 71 supra Justice O'Brien recently commented on this very point: "Arguably, [an ineffectiveness) determination by this court will be sufficient to get beyond the plead... Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 497, 406 A.2d 735, 745
ings in any subsequent civil suit.
(1979) (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of liability of court appointed attorneys, see Mallen, The Court-Appointed
Lawyer andLegal Malpractice-Liabilityor Immunity, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 59 (1976); Comment, Liabilityof Court-Appointed Defense Counselfor Malpractice in FederalCriminal Prosecuions, 57 IowA L. REV. 1420 (1972).
260. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (with amendments to Feb. 1980).
Cannon 6 provides: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently."
261. 204 PA. CODE § 87.2 (Rules of the Disciplinary Board).
262. Id at § 85.8. See also note 253 supra
263. See note 91 supra
264.

See notes 78 & 79 and accompanying text supra

265.
266.
267.

See note 105 supra
See notes 185-206 and accompanying text supra,
See note 140 supra

Justice Flaherty of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
commented on the future of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "This

Court is developing into an innovative court. . not afraid to examine principles of law to see their applicability to human
problems ....-268 A new substantive and procedural standard for
effective assistance of counsel would be the first step in an innovative
direction. Until the supreme court takes that step, however, both the
legal system and the legal profession in Pennsylvania will suffer from
the courts ineffective interpretation of an individual's fundamental
constitutional rights.2 69
BARBARA

J.

BUBA

268. Moyle, Justice Flaherty-Populist on the Supreme Court, 2 THE PA. LAW. 20, 22
(1980).
The status of the effective assistance standard in Pennsylvania brings to mind Justice
Musmanno's observations on the progressiveness of Pennsylvania courts:
It is a matter of infinite regret to me that in the train of Progress in the Law of
Humanity, Pennsylvania is a car frequently clattering close to the caboose instead of
cheerfully gliding over the rails immediately behind the locomotive. Why is it that in
ameliorating the rigors of common law, Pennsylvania must copy after other states,
rather than taking the lead?...
Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 273, 220 A.2d 646, 648 (1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
269. The following quotation perhaps best illustrates the tenor of Pennsylvania courts:
So far, there has been a general reluctance of courts to find a denial of effective
counsel. It is a known fact that most such claims are without merit, and frequently
petitioner is merely grasping at legal straws in a bid for freedom. Honoring the claim
condemns the defense attorney, and, moreover, in some instances, would censure the
trial judge, and even the prosecutor, for failure to do justice. Upholding such claims
would also have the effect of forcing the trial judge to intervene whenever possible
error is being committed by defense counsel and otherwise alter his traditional umpire role in an adversary system. The honoring of such claims would also increase
the reluctance of many lawyers to accept court assignments.
McGee, Defense ofIndigents-CurrentStatus, 29 ALA. LAW 408, 425-26 (1968).

